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TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT, TRADEMARK DILUTION, 
AND THE DECLINE IN SHARING OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES: 





 Many famous brand names have historically been shared among dozens 
or even hundreds of different companies.1  Courts and commentators often cite 
well-known examples of sharing like Delta Airlines and Delta Faucets,2 or 
United Airlines and United Van Lines,3 but the list of companies sharing these 
brand names and many others is much, much longer.  Trademark infringement 
law has traditionally accommodated brand-name sharing through doctrines that 
limit protection to closely related goods and to actual trading areas.4  Modern 
developments in infringement law, however, have challenged those doctrines,5 
and trademark dilution legislation is arguably based on the theory that some 
brand names are harmed by, and should be protected against, any sharing at 
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1 We do not intend the terms “share” and “sharing,” as we use them in this Article, to 
imply that one user of a brand name has granted permission to another, or that there is 
any agreement between multiple users of a brand name about their concurrent use.  We 
are aware that “share” sometimes connotes permission or agreement, or even altruistic 
motivation, which is why, for example, the use of the phrase “file sharing” to describe 
peer-to-peer Internet distribution has been so contentious.  We have not, however, 
found better terms to refer to multiple concurrent uses of a single brand name, and 
students of trademark law will recognize that the phrase “concurrent use” would be 
confusing because it has gained a particular meaning in the Lanham Act in connection 
with concurrent registrations.  See 15 U.S.C. §§  1052(d), 1067(a). 
2 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Autovation Technologies, 317 F. Supp. 2d 756, 761 
(E.D. Mich. 2004) 
3 See, e.g., Intermatic Inc v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
4 See infra TAN 9-10.  
5 See infra TAN xx –xx. 





all.6  While some cheer this increased protection,7 others fear that it will make 
brand-name sharing more difficult, and will thereby reduce the stock of brand 
names available to businesses.8  Despite the long-running controversy, 
however, to our knowledge no one has attempted to construct a framework for 
analyzing brand-name sharing or to conduct empirical studies to determine 
whether broader trademark protection has actually affected rates of brand-name 
sharing. 
 This article provides an introduction to the study of brand-name 
sharing, and presents results from an empirical study of sharing rates among 
131 famous brand names from 1940 through 2010, conducted through an 
examination of business names in the white pages telephone directories of 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Manhattan.  Perhaps the most dramatic finding of 
the study is that independent uses of the 131 brand names – that is, uses of 
those names by businesses other than those that made the names famous – have 
declined from 3000 to 1380 between 1960 and 2010, a 54% drop.  The article 
then assesses potential causes for that decline.  We evaluate five potential non-
legal factors, including economic changes, family migration, decreased 
attractiveness of particular famous brands, changes in the popularity of business 
name types, and changes in cultural naming patterns.  It then considers 
evidence that changes in trademark infringement and dilution law underlie 
some part of the decline.  The article concludes that both legal and non-legal 
factors have likely played a role.    
                                                 
6 See infra TAN xx-xx. 
7See, e.g., Joshua Jones, The “Inequities” of Dilution:  How the Federal Judiciary May 
Use Principles of Equity to Frustrate the Intent of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 
91 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 200, 2002 (2009) (“The judicial response to this 
sudden infusion of dilution into state trademark jurisprudence was tepid at best.”); 
Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting 
“Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007); Tara D. Rose, The High 
Price of Fame Deserves a Discount:  A Call for Uniform Dilution Law in North 
America for the Protection of Well Known Trademarks, 14 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE IN 
AM. 195, 197 (2007) (“Protection from trademark dilution is an important international 
concern requiring uniform protection. Uniform protection will create an incentive for 
manufacturers to produce quality products, resulting in accurate reputations on which 
the public can depend.”); RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND 
TRADEMARKS 1643 (2d ed. 1950) (“Dilution is an infection, which, if allowed to 
spread, will inevitably destroy the value of a mark altogether.”).
8 See, e.g., Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer,  23 
BERKELEY J. L. & TECH. 1227, 1230 (2008) (“overly strict protection of mark 
familiarity through the law of trademark dilution can burden competitors who signal 
product quality and reliability”); Jesse A. Hofrichter, Tool of the Trademark:  Brand 
Criticism and Free Speech Problems with the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1926 (2007) (dilution law “may prove ineffective 
in application,  and how [  ] will not adequately shield all protected speech from threats 
of litigation, resulting in a “chilling effect” on speech.”); Julie Zando-Dennis, Not 
Playing Around: The Chilling Power of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 






 Part I of the Article reviews the history of brand-name sharing and of 
the legal doctrines that address it.  Part II introduces the empirical study and 
explains its design.  Since this study is unique, we provide a detailed 
justification for our methodology.  Part III summarizes the results of the study, 
including totals and breakdowns by type of brand name, city, and year.  Part IV 
considers potential non-legal causes of the decline in brand-name sharing rates.  
Part V assesses the argument that increased trademark infringement protection, 
and the introduction of dilution protection, were among the causes of the 
decline. Part VI concludes that any evaluation of extant law or proposal for 
future reform must account for the sharing phenomenon we describe.  The 
complete database generated by the study, as well as all spreadsheets used to 
analyze the data, database documentation, and coding rules, are available 
online.9
 
I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO BRAND-NAME SHARING AND ITS LEGAL TREATMENT 
 
Trademark lawyers may dream of a world in which each separate 
source of goods or services is identified by a unique brand name, but the 
sharing of brand names was ubiquitous well before Congress ever passed a 
federal trademark law.   Numerous business proprietors who shared a family 
name had affixed that name to their goods and services, and thus in a single city 
like Philadelphia one can find unrelated businesses operating under such names 
as Baker Chocolate and Cocoa, Baker Beauty Shop, Baker Clothes, Baker 
Funeral Home, and Baker Pickling Company.  Scores of others who lived in the 
same area had affixed to their businesses the name of their city, their river, their 
mountain, or their street.  In the Chicago neighborhood of Rogers Park, for 
example, businesses operate under such names as the Rogers Park Auto Body 
Shop, Rogers Park Coiffures, Rogers Park Fine Wines and Spirit, Rogers Park 
Insurance Group, and Rogers Park Locksmith.  Yet others had adopted names 
that they hoped would convey reliability, innovation, status, thrift, or other 
desirable qualities.  The American Ever Ready Company decided that 
“Eveready” was a good brand name for its products – in its case, flashlights and 
batteries -- but it was joined by many other companies: in the 1960 New York 
telephone book alone, fourteen businesses bore that name, including Eveready 
Delivery Service Inc., Eveready Match Co., Eveready Sewing Machine Co., 
and Eveready Television Service. 
 The judges and legislators who crafted trademark policy had to 
recognize the reality that  names such as “Baker,” Rogers Park,” and 
“Eveready,” though shared, were still serving as brand names, and could not be 
denied trademark protection altogether.  They therefore crafted a series of 
doctrines that accommodated widespread sharing.  The doctrine that protection 
for a trademark extended only to its area of geographical use enabled many 
                                                 







local businesses situated in different areas to share the same brand name.10  
And the doctrine that a trademark was only protected against use on goods and 
services of the same type enabled even those businesses whose geographical 
markets overlapped to share the same brand name, so long as they specialized 
in different fields of manufacture or trade.11
Although these doctrines were probably fashioned to accommodate a 
pre-existing reality rather than to promote an ideal, in time brand name sharing 
was recognized to have certain virtues.  There is not an infinite stock of equally 
memorable, mellifluous, evocative, and fashionable brand names,12 and thus 
arrangements that allow many businesses to share one brand name promote 
more efficient and equitable use of a scarce resource.13  Indeed, the sharing of a 
brand name may contribute to its memorability, since completely unfamiliar 
names may be more difficult to remember.14  In addition, there may be some 
                                                 
10  See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916) (first user of mark 
does not gain priority in remote area); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90 (1918) (same); 
11 See Act of February 20, 1905, § 5, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 85 (denying registration to 
marks that are identical or similar to registered or known marks “appropriated to 
merchandise of the same descriptive properties”); Consumers Petroleum Co. v. 
Consumers Co. of Ill., 169 F.2d 153 (7th Cir,. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 902 (1949) 
(applying the 1905 Act rule) 
12 Just one of many constraints, for example, is that it is demonstrably easier to 
remember words that are meaningful than those that are not, and there is a limited stock 
of meaningful words.  See Kim Robertson, Strategically Desirable Brand Name 
Characteristics, 1 J. OF PRODUCT AND BRAND MANAGEMENT 62, 64-65 (1992); 
Rabindra N. Kanungo, Brand Awareness: Effects of Fittingness, Meaningfulness, and 
Product Utility, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 290, 294 (1968). 
13 The broader principle that good brand names are a scarce resource has been 
recognized on many occasions throughout the history of U.S. trademark law.  For 
example, the elimination of the “token use” doctrine and the shortening of the 
registration renewal period in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 were justified 
as measures to remove the amount of “deadwood” on the federal register, a “serious 
problem” because “[u]nused marks on the trademark register prevent others wishing to 
use those marks from doing so.”  Report of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 
5372, 101-1028 (1988), p. 11.  For academic recognition of this principle, see Stephen 
Carter, The Trouble with Trademarks, 99 YALE L. J. 759, 759 (1990).  (“The traditional 
economic justification for trademark law rests on the premise that the set of available 
marks is virtually infinite and, in consequence, that the actual mark chosen by a firm to 
represent its goods is irrelevant. If that assumption turns out to be false—if even before 
the public comes to associate a mark with any particular goods or services, some marks 
are more desirable than others—then allowing protection of marks devoid of market 
significance may raise substantial barriers to entry by competitors.”)  
14 Experiments have shown that in some contexts, a somewhat less common name such 
as “Felix” is easier to remember than a more common name such as “John.”  See Nicola 
Stanhope & Gillian Cohen, Retrieval of Proper Names: Testing the Models, 84 BRITISH 
J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 51, 64 (1993).  However, we believe it intuitively to be true that 
completely unfamiliar foreign names are more difficult to remember upon first 
exposure.  Readers whose only native language is English can ask themselves whether 





value in not placing the meanings and associations connected with a word 
under the dominant control of a single commercial entity.15
In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the practice of 
brand name sharing has faced increasing challenges.  First, under U.S. law, 
trademark rights are no longer always limited to the geographic area of actual 
use.  Section 22 of the Lanham Act, passed in 1946, provided for the first time 
that a registration on the Principal Register would provide constructive 
nationwide notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership in a mark.16  Courts 
held that such notice eliminated the good faith that another user would need to 
establish or expand an exclusive right to use the mark on similar goods or 
services.17  The result was that the first user to register the mark obtained the 
right to expand its use of the mark to every region of the United States that 
other users were not already operating.  The first registrant thus had the power 
after expansion to limit others who were using the mark before the registration 
date to their historical trading area,18 and to prevent those who commenced use 
after the date of registration from using the mark at all.19     
At the same time, the Lanham Act extended these advantages of 
registration to many marks that had previously been excluded from registration 
under the Trademark Act of 1905.  Perhaps most significantly, the 1905 Act 
had excluded from registration marks that consisted “merely in the name of an 
individual, firm, corporation or association . . . or merely in words . . . which 
are descriptive of the goods with which they are used . . . or merely a 
geographical name or term.”20  By contrast, the Lanham Act allows inherently 
                                                                                                                       
Chinese name like Xiaoguang or Yangyue, a Hindu name like Anirudh or Sharmila, or 
a Thai name like Adirake or Malivalaya.   
15 See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 
1992) (putting “New Kids” mark under the complete control of the boy band would 
have deleterious economic consequences).
16 Trademark Act of 1946, P.L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, § 22.  The Federal Trademark 
Law Revision Act of 1988 confirmed and strengthened the nationwide rights granted by 
federal registration, by providing explicitly that “filing of the application to register [a] 
mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a right of priority, 
nationwide in effect, on or in connection with the goods specified in the registration,” 
subject to a number of exceptions.  Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-
667, 102 Stat. 3935 (effective Nov. 16, 1989), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). 
17 See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 
1959);  In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ; Action 
Temporary Services, Inc. v. Labor Force, Inc., 870 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
18 See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968). 
19 At least as soon as a senior registered user wants to expand into the geographic area 
of the junior user, it can obtain an injunction to force the junior user to cease use of the 
mark, a threat that would likely lead many junior users to change their brand names 
even before they were ordered to.  See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 
F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959).  Moreover, more recent precedent has questioned whether 
the senior registered user need demonstrate use in the same geographical area before 
obtaining an injunction. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047 (6th 
Cir. 1999). 







distinctive firm names to be registered immediately, and individual names, 
descriptive words, and geographical terms to be registered upon proof of 
acquired distinctiveness, so long as they are not deceptive.21         
 Secondly, as many commentators have detailed, the scope of 
infringement protection has increased substantially, from protection only 
against goods and services essentially identical to those with which the 
plaintiff’s use is connected, to protection against goods and services that are 
much more distantly related.22   
This expanded scope of protection along both geographic and subject-
matter dimensions may be traceable in part to changes in judicial and legislative 
attitudes, including attitudes about whether granting broad trademark protection 
fosters monopolies.  Yet changes in commercial realities have also played a role 
in the expansion.  For example, because very small businesses can now offer 
goods for sale nationwide and globally on the Internet, small no longer 
necessarily means local.  At the same time, as large conglomerates have 
become more common, consumers have become used to seeing a single 
corporate name in connection with a wide variety of products.  And although 
umbrella branding of disparate goods has sometimes been an incidental result 
of corporate growth, it has also increasingly been the result of intentional 
branding strategies.  Companies that have decided to build a brand around a 
lifestyle – Virgin, Calvin Klein, and Harley Davidson come to mind – market a 
wide variety of goods and services under a single brand name.  
 At least in theory, however, the most radical challenge to brand name 
sharing has come from the passage of state and federal trademark dilution 
statutes.  Although the exact rationale for protection against trademark dilution 
is much debated,23 proponents of such protection contend that there is value in 
concentrating all rights to use and control a brand name in a single business, 
regardless of whether other businesses would use that name on similar goods or 
services, or whether multiple independent uses would be likely to cause 
confusion among consumers.24  In 1947, shortly after an attempt to include a 
federal anti-dilution provision in the Lanham Act failed, states began to pass 
anti-dilution statutes, and there are now 38 states that have such statutes.25  In 
1995, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which became 
                                                 
21 See Trademark Act of 1946, §2(f). 
22 See, e.g., Gerard Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in 
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 994-1006 (2001) (arguing that the likelihood of 
confusion broadened substantially by the 1960s, rendering state dilution statutes 
redundant and obsolete); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1913-14 (2007).  The Lanham expressly provides 
protection against confusion as to “association, sponsorship or approval” in 35 U.S.C. § 
1125(a). 
23 See DAVID F. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION:  FEDERAL, STATE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 
24 See supra note ___. 
25 See Caroline Chicoine & Jennifer Visintine, The Role of State Trademark Dilution 
Statutes in Light of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 96 TRADEMARK 





effective the following year.26  Unlike previous trademark law, these statutes 
contemplate that some brand names will be protected against any sharing at all.  
The state and federal anti-dilution laws, however, clearly do not 
contemplate granting absolute protection against sharing to all brand names.  
Rather, they offer that protection only to brand names which meet certain 
standards.  Chief among those is the requirement of fame: the use of the brand 
name by the business seeking protection must be well-known.  Since 2006, 
federal law has required that a brand name be “widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the 
goods or services of the mark’s owner.”27  Although federal law does not 
further specify what “widely recognized” means, Professor J. Thomas 
McCarthy has offered his opinion that “a minimum threshold survey response 
should be in the range of 75% of the general consuming public of the United 
States.”28  That is a very high standard, which will be met by a very low 
percentage of brand name users.  Twenty-four of the 38 state anti-dilution laws 
currently in force, especially those modeled after the 1992 and 1996 Model 
State Trademark Bill, require that a brand name use be “famous in this state.”29  
That standard would seem to be best interpreted as similar to the current federal 
standard, but applied to the consuming public of a particular state rather than all 
50 of the United States. Three states have enacted a version of the 2007 Model 
State Trademark Bill, which changed the definition of “famous” to “widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of [the] state or a geographic area 
within [the] state.”30  That definition even more closely follows federal law in 
its insistence on wide recognition by the general consuming public, but opens 
up the possibility that the geographic focus might be on a portion of the state 
rather than the state as a whole.  Finally, 11 states currently have anti-dilution 
statutes that draw language from the 1964 Model State Trademark Bill, which 
did not explicitly require fame, but authorized injunctive relief against the 
“likelihood of dilution” of the “distinctive quality” of a mark.31  Although 
interpretation of this language is not uniform, it is clear that the fame of a mark 
is an important factor in determining whether the mark has a “distinctive 
quality” that could be subject to dilution.32
While the fame of a brand name is quite well established as a necessary 
condition of blanket protection against brand name sharing, it also seems clear 
from the statutes and cases that it is not a sufficient condition.  It is almost 
certain, for example, that the general consuming public of the United States 
                                                 
26 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act, P.L. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995). 
27 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
28 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 24:106 (4th ed.). 
29 See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, 
Table 1-1 (State-by-State Comparison of Dilution Statutes) (2009). 
30  See id. 
31  See id. 
32 See WELKOWITZ, supra note ___, at 32-40 (discussing interpretation of statutes 







would recognize as famous brand names like “American” and “United” for 
airline transportation; yet it is also virtually certain that the owners of those 
marks could not obtain protection against dilution.33  Exactly why they could 
not, and whether additional conditions are properly framed as requirements for 
eligibility or as factors in proving dilution, has been a matter of contention.  As 
we will detail below, it does seem clear that two additional factors play a large 
role in determining whether relief will be granted: the extent to which a brand 
name is already shared among many users – often referred to as the extent of 
“third-party use” in the context of litigation between two users– and the degree 
of distinctiveness of the brand name, along the traditional spectrum from 
generic to coined.  “American” and “United” do not fare well with either of 
these two factors.  They are shared by many other businesses, and as applied to 
airline services, the names do not seem to be particularly distinctive: 
“American” seems to be descriptive of airline transportation that is based and 
largely provided in America, and “United” suggests that a number of 
independent service providers may have been consolidated.  Yet, it is not clear 
exactly how and why these facts should be taken into account.   
Consider, first, the degree of existing sharing, or third-party use.  The 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act originally treated third-party use as a factor in 
determining whether a mark was famous, and therefore entitled to dilution 
protection at all.34  The Trademark Dilution Reform Act eliminated third-party 
use as an explicit factor in determining fame, but at the same time it added 
third-party use as an explicit factor in determining whether the defendant’s use 
was likely to cause dilution by blurring of the plaintiff’s famous mark.35  
Meanwhile, courts that have applied state dilution statutes under which dilution 
is defined as a loss of “distinctive quality” have found that third-party uses 
make a mark less distinctive or weaker.  For example, in the 1980 case of 
Amstar Corp. Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc.,36 the Fifth Circuit, applying Georgia 
law, considered whether the defendant’s use of the mark “Domino” for pizza 
diluted the plaintiff’s use of the same mark for sugar.  It noted that the trial 
court record contained evidence of 72 third-party federal registrations for 
“Domino,” and further evidence of 15 third-party uses of the mark from 1885 to 
the present.37  The court held that the plaintiff had no claim against the 
defendant under Georgia’s anti-dilution statute because “‘Domino,’ outside of 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(remarking that not all famous marks exhibit the distinctiveness required for dilution 
protection, and citing “American, National, Federal, Federated, First, United, Acme, 
Merit, [and] Ace” as examples).  
34 See P.L. 104-98, §3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(G) 
(1996) (directing courts to consider, in determining whether a mark is distinctive and 
famous, “the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties.” 
35 See P.L. 109-312, §2, 120 Stat. 1729, 1731 (2006), codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) (directing courts to consider, among other factors, “[t]he 
extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaged in substantially exclusive use 
of the mark”). 
36 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980). 





plaintiff’s line of sugars and portion-control items, has already become a weak 
mark.”38  The Court of Appeals of New York, interpreting the similarly worded 
New York dilution statute, considered the degree of third-party use as relevant 
to whether the plaintiff’s use had gained secondary meaning, although it seems 
that the court was treating “secondary meaning” as akin to fame among the 
general public: 
A quick glance at the New York City phone directories will 
reveal the existence of at least 300 business entities in the 
metropolitan area incorporating the word “allied” in their trade 
name. In light of the large number of business entities using the 
generic term allied in their trade name, it cannot be said that the 
name “allied” has acquired a secondary meaning. We remain 
unconvinced that the public associates the word “allied” with 
the plaintiff's cleaning and maintenance service.39   
          
Perhaps the relevance of third-party use can be explained in terms of 
psychological theories of dilution under which dilution is a particular 
phenomenon that occurs in the minds of consumers.40  Yet it is also possible 
that legislators and courts are reacting to more disparate equitable factors.  If 
the plaintiff adopted a brand name that was already in common use at the time 
of adoption, then it may seem that the plaintiff was not particularly concerned 
about the uniqueness of its brand name, and it should have to live with its 
                                                 
38 Id. at 265; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, comment e 
(noting that “a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a nonconfusing use 
[only] if the mark retains its source significance when encountered outside of the 
context of the goods or services with which the mark is used by the trademark owner,” 
and that “[c]oncurrent use by others makes it unlikely that consumers will form a single 
mental association between the mark and one specific user.”). 
39 Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 545-
546, 369 N.E.2d 628, 633  (1977). 
40 For example, consumers may make associations between trademarks and certain 
types of products, such as an association between “Heineken” and “beer”; on one 
theory, dilution is the weakening of those associations.  See Sara Stadler Nelson, The 
Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 71 (2003); Maureen Morrin & 
Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. 
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265 (2000).  Or maybe consumers make associations 
between trademarks and certain desirata such as sportiness or luxury or tradition, and 
dilution is the weakening of those associations.  See  Shahar J. Dilbary, FAMOUS 
TRADEMARKS AND THE RATIONAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING “IRRATIONAL BELIEFS,” 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007).  Or perhaps consumers become familiar and 
comfortable with whatever associations they make with particular marks, and dilution is 
the weakening of this comfort.  See Laura Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the 
Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1227 (2008).  Although they differ, 
these theories all seek to reduce dilution to one particular type of phenomenon in the 
mind of the consumer, and contend that dilution occurs if and only if that phenomenon 







decision.41  If three hundred other businesses have chosen to adopt a particular 
brand name, then it may seem unfair not to let the three-hundred-and-first 
business do the same. 
The same is true of the issue of distinctiveness.  In the narrow sense of 
the placement of the mark along the generic-fanciful continuum, distinctiveness 
has always been treated as relevant, but exactly how and why has varied.  The 
original Federal Trademark Dilution Act granted protection to marks that were 
“distinctive and famous.”42 The Second Circuit, parting with some other 
circuits,43 interpreted that language to mean that distinctiveness was a 
requirement for protection separate from fame,44 and later held that only marks 
which were inherently distinctive could claim protection under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act.45  The Trademark Dilution Reform Act then made it 
clear that protection was not limited to inherently distinctive marks,46 but at the 
same time it made clear that the degree of inherent distinctiveness – and of 
acquired distinctiveness – was a factor relevant to determining whether dilution 
had occurred.47   
Here, too, one could attempt to explain the relevance of this factor in 
terms of a psychological theory of dilution, or one could understand it as an 
expression of more diverse  judgments regarding efficiency and equity.  If a 
company invests resources in coining a new word to serve as a brand name, and 
thereby avoids depleting the finite stock of existing words, then perhaps we 
should be less hesitant to protect it against sharing, whether or not such sharing 
is particularly likely to cause dilution by blurring.  And if another company 
chooses to adopt that coined word as a brand name, it is more likely that it did 
so with the intention of taking advantage of some of the luster with which the 
first company imbued that name, and for those who think that the luster should 
belong to its creator, denying use of the name to the second adopter seems the 
fair result. 
To complicate matters, the factors of fame, third-party use and 
distinctiveness are invariably listed by courts as factors in determining the 
                                                 
41 Cf.  Sunbeam Lighting Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1950) (“If, in 
course of our free enterprise, someone would market an unworthy article outside 
plaintiff's field bearing the name Sunbeam it must be borne as not an unlikely 
circumstance following plaintiff's selection of a non-fanciful word popular with 
commercial concerns.”). 
42 See P.L. 104-98, §3, 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1) 
(1996) 
43 See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, LLC, 212 F.3d 157, 
167 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001). 
44 See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1999).  
45 See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001).     
46 See P.L. 109-312, §2, 120 Stat. 1729, 1731 (2006), codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1) 
(extending protection against dilution to “the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness”). 
47 See id., codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(B)(ii) (listing, among factors relevant to 
whether a plaintiff’s mark was subject to dilution by blurring, “The degree of inherent 





likelihood of confusion, and thus also play a large role in determining the scope 
of trademark infringement protection.48  If an arbitrary or fanciful brand name 
is famous, and there are few other users, a court is likely to grant infringement 
protection to the famous user against more distant lines of business. 49  Thus, 
from a functional point of view one could see dilution protection simply as an 
extension of infringement protection.  Under infringement law, fame, 
distinctiveness, and thinness of third-party use all increase the subject-matter 
scope of protection.  Dilution simply adds a categorical threshold: at some 
point, a level of fame, distinctiveness and rarity is reached at which no other 
user can share the brand name.  If that threshold is set low, then the 
introduction of dilution protection will have a substantial effect on brand name 
sharing; but if it is set high, the introduction of dilution protection will have a 
less noticeable effect. 
 
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT 
 
                                                 
48 As every trademark law student soon learns, each circuit has its own list of factors to 
consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks, 
but they invariably include both third-party use and distinctiveness, sometimes 
considered together as the factor of the “strength” of the mark.  See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. 
v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (factors include “the strength 
of the mark”); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) (factors 
include “the strength of the mark”); In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 
1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (factors include “the number and nature of similar marks in use 
on similar goods”);  
49 To be sure, in the trademark infringement context, courts often state that they 
consider third-party uses on similar goods and services much more relevant than such 
uses on dissimiliar goods and services.  See, e.g., Morningside Group Ltd.  v. 
Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 139  (2d Cir. 1999) (“Use of a like 
mark in a different market for different products or services need not undermine the 
mark’s strength in its own market”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of 
America, 970 F.2d 874, 877-878 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Some courts have even stated that 
third-party uses on dissimilar goods and services are completely irrelevant to the issue 
of infringement, such that evidence of such uses is properly excluded.  See Eclipse 
Associates Ltd. v. Data General Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that it was not error to exclude evidence of use of the plaintiff’s mark “Eclipse” in 
fields unrelated to computers, such as floor cleaning products, commercial laundry 
folding equipment, and industrial process heating equipment).   
The focus on uses on similar goods and services potentially distinguishes the 
inquiry into third-party uses in infringement cases from that in dilution cases.  
However, when the issue is how broadly a mark is protected against merely marginally 
similar uses, the number of third-party uses even on dissimilar goods should be 
relevant.  See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 11:88 (4th ed.) 
(“some evidence of unrelated use is necessary where the alleged mark is in widespread 
use in many fields, such as ACME, NATIONAL or PREMIUM.  That is, evidence of 
extensive third party use on a wide range of goods and services does tend to weaken 







A. The Dearth and Potential Relevance of Empirical Work on Brand 
Name Sharing 
 
 Because brand name sharing has been a feature of commercial life for 
centuries, the challenges posed by recent developments in trademark 
infringement and dilution law, should have generated a substantial body of 
research on patterns and trends in brand name sharing.  However, virtually all 
of the empirical work done on trademark infringement and dilution has focused 
on litigation, rather than actual brand name uses in the marketplace.50  Indeed, 
the only report we have found of research on brand name sharing is a three and-
a-half page article published in 1950 by George Kingsley Zipf, a Professor of 
Linguistics at Harvard University.51
Zipf had previously undertaken a study of word use frequency in 
spoken and written language. He had demonstrated that a very small number of 
words account for most word uses, and he devised a formula to predict the 
frequency distribution of those uses, which became known as “Zipf’s law.”  
Under Zipf’s law, the second-most-frequently-used word has one-half the 
number of uses of the most-frequently-used word; the third has one-third the 
number of uses, and so on.  Zipf sought out broader applications of this formula 
of distribution of frequency, and also attempted to explain the phenomenon of 
concentration by means of a psychological “Principal of Least Effort,” 
according to which human beings follow well-known paths that lead them to 
reuse familiar words.52   One of the applications on which Zipf focused was 
brand name uses.  Zipf tallied the brand name uses in the 1947 edition of 
Thomas’ Register of American Manufacturers, and found that the frequency 
                                                 
50 Empirical studies of trademark litigation include Barton Beebe, The Continuing 
Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 449 (2008); 
Justin J. Gunnell, Goldilocks and the Three Federal Dilution Standards: An Empirical 
Review, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 101 (2008); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: 
The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008); Clarisa Long, 
DILUTION, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1029 (2006); and Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the 
Moseley Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, May 17, 2006, http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=903003.
51 George Kingsley Zipf, A Note on Brand Names and Related Economic Phenomena, 
18 ECONOMETRICA 260 (1950).  Other important work on rates of use of brand names, 
though not on rates of brand name sharing by multiple businesses, includes a series of 
articles by Monroe Friedman on the frequency of appearance of brand names in popular 
American novels, American and British hit plays, and American newspapers.  See 
Monroe Friedman, The changing language of a consumer society: brand name usage in 
popular American novels in the postwar era, 11 J. OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 927 
(1985); Monroe Friedman, Brand-name use in news columns of American newspapers 
since 1964, 63 JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 161 (1986); Monroe Friedman, Commercial 
influences in popular literature: an empirical study of brand name usage in American 
and British hit plays in the postwar era, 4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ARTS 63 (1986).   






distribution of brand names in that register roughly fit his formula.  
Unfortunately, his article does not reveal what the most frequently used brand 
names were, nor does it provide any other information about the brand name 
uses that Zipf was tallying.  Rather, the results of his research were conveyed in 
a single sentence in his article that reported the frequency distribution of brand 
names in the 1947 Thomas’ Register.53    
We think that there are many other questions that empirical work on 
brand name sharing might help to answer, although in some cases they are very 
difficult questions.  Because the most radical form of protection against brand 
name sharing – trademark dilution protection – is typically granted only to 
famous brand names, a particularly interesting subset of these questions 
concerns the sharing of such famous names, or more precisely, of brand names 
of which a particular use has become famous.  These questions include: 
• As an historical matter, how common is it for brand names that have one 
famous use to be shared by other users?   Are some types of famous brand 
names more susceptible to multiple uses than others?  Answers to these 
questions would help us to better understand the phenomenon of famous 
brand name sharing, and would provide a baseline against which changes 
can be measured.  
• Have there been changes in the rates of sharing of famous brand names 
over time?  In particular, is there any evidence that the enactment of 
dilution laws, combined with broader application of trademark 
infringement law, has caused a reduction in the rate of sharing of famous 
brand names?  Answers to such questions would help us understand how 
and why brand name sharing rates change, and whether major legislative 
efforts to provide additional protection against brand name sharing have 
been effective. 
• Is there any evidence that suggests that changes in rates of sharing are 
caused by changes in the popularity of the famous uses of those names?   
An answer to this question would help us assess the validity of the 
contention, often advanced by famous users of brand names, that other 
users of that name have adopted it in an effort to benefit from the popularity 
of the famous use.       
• Are high rates of sharing of a famous brand name correlated with a shorter 
life of the famous use of that brand name?  Conversely, do famous uses of 
brand names last longer if they are sparsely shared?  Answers to these 
questions would help us understand the gravity of the harm that brand name 
sharing is claimed to do to famous uses of those names.       
We cannot hope with this initial study to provide definitive answers to all of 
these questions, but we can provide the first empirical study of brand sharing 
and begin to answer some of them. 
                                                 
53 See Zipf, supra note xx, at 261 (“The x-number of different brand-names in the 
United States (entire population in Thomas' Register) used by the same y-number of 









B. The Scope and Design of the Study 
 
 The empirical study traced the number of uses of 131 different brand 
names in the white pages telephone books of three urban jurisdictions – the city 
of Chicago, the New York City borough of Manhattan, and the city of 
Philadelphia – in six different years: 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.  
As detailed below, we had reason to believe that all of the 131 brand names had 
one use that would qualify in some or all of those years as “famous to the 
general consuming public of the United States,” thus satisfying the post-TDRA 
requirement for fame, which we believe to be the most stringent fame 
requirement ever incorporated into any state or federal law.  Of those 131 brand 
names, we identified 45 names as having a use that was proven to be 
consistently famous over virtually the entire period of our study, since the use 
appeared both in a national brand recognition study conducted in 1920 and 
1921, and in a follow-up study conducted in 1997.  In the next two sections, we 
provide further detail about the brand names selected, and about the scope and 
methodology of the study. 
   
          1.  The Brand Names Chosen for the Study 
 Most of our brand names came from a study published in 1923, and a 
follow-up study published in 1997.  In 1920 and 1921, two New York 
University professors, George B. Hotchkiss & Richard B. Franken, conducted a 
study “of 100 representative commodities showing the names and brands that 
are most familiar to the public.”54  Hotchkiss and Franken surveyed 1024 
college students – 512 men and 512 women.  They provided their subjects with 
a list of 100 product categories, such as automobiles, canned fruits, insurance, 
and hosiery, and asked them to list the most prominent brands they associated 
with each category.55  The responses of those subjects provide a snapshot of 
which brand names were best known in their product markets in the early 
1920s. We excluded 34 of those 100 product categories for one of four reasons.  
First, in 13 of the categories less than 10% of the subjects mentioned any one 
brand name.  In those cases, we decided, no brand name was likely famous 
enough to merit study.  Second, in another 13 cases, the product category itself 
has become obsolete – consumers no longer buy corsets, or hair tonic, or collars 
separate from shirts regularly enough that a leading brand in those categories 
would likely be famous to the general public.  Third, in seven cases, tracking 
brand name uses posed particular difficulties.  For example, the leading brand 
of oil in the Hotchkiss study was “3 in 1,” featuring numbers rather than words.  
Lastly, in one case, involving the category of linen, the leading “brand” 
mentioned by the subjects was “Irish,” which was in reality not a brand but a 
place of origin. 
                                                 
54 GEORGE B. HOTCHKISS & RICHARD B. FRANKEN, THE LEADERSHIP OF ADVERTISED 
BRANDS (1923). 





 That left us with 66 product categories from the Hotchkiss and Franken 
study.  We chose to track the top brand in each of those categories.  Because 
some brands were leaders in more than one category – for example, 
“Waterman” led in both ink and pens56 – the Hotchkiss and Franken study 
contributed 59 brand names. 
 In 1997, Professor Peter Golder published a follow-up study, tracking 
the longevity of the Hotchkiss and Franken brands in all 100 categories (though 
Golder also considered some categories to be obsolete).57  Rather than 
conducting another survey, Golder used market share information to identify 
the most prominent brands in each category.  In 20 of the 66 categories we 
selected from the Hotchkiss and Franken study, the leading brand identified by 
Golder was the same brand identified as most prominent by Hotchkiss and 
Franken.  In the other 46 categories, it was different.  However, in five cases, 
the new leading brand in the Golder study had been a leading brand in a 
different category in the Hotchkiss study.58  As a result, the Golder study added 
41 new brand names to our list (as explained below), for a total of 100 brand 
names from the Hotchkiss and Golder studies.59    
Although the brand ranked number one in the Hotchkiss study retained 
its preeminence in only 20 categories included in the Golder study, the two 
studies reveal a much greater degree of brand continuity if a somewhat broader 
view is taken.  This can be seen from two perspectives: first, by examining the 
fate of the brands that led in 46 categories in Hotchkiss but failed to retain their 
number one spot in Golder, and second, by examining the provenance of the 
brands that became the new leaders in those 46 categories in Golder. 
In the case of the Hotchkiss leaders that lost their top spot, 16 of them 
appear in prominent, but slightly lower, positions in the Golder study – seven in 
the number two spot, six at number three, and one each at numbers four, five, 
and seven.  Thus, in only 30 of the categories do the Hotchkiss brands 
disappear completely in Golder.  And even then, “disappearing completely” 
likely carries too weighty a connotation.  Six of the 30 categories feature brands 
that continue to appear in the Golder study in other categories, often closely 
related categories.  Those brands are “Cross,” “Goodyear,” “Heinz,” and 
“Waterman.”  Among the brands in the remaining 24 categories, many, we 
                                                 
56 The other leaders in multiple categories included “Colgate,” which led in shaving 
soap and toothpaste; “Goodyear,” which led in tires, raincoats and rubbers; and 
“Heinz,” which led in baked beans, jelly or jam, and spaghetti. 
57 Peter Golder, Historical Method in Marketing Research with New Evidence on Long-
Term Market Share Stability, 37 J. MARKETING RES. 156 (2000). 
58  Those brands, listed with the category they newly led in Golder and followed in 
parentheses by the category they led in Hotchkiss, include “Campbell’s” in baked beans 
(soup); “Colgate” in toothbrushes  (toothpaste); “Cross” in pens (leather goods); 
“Gillette” in shaving soap (razors); and “Hershey” in candies (chocolate).   
59 In fact, the 41 names we tracked from Golder include one further subtraction and one 
addition.  On the one hand, we did not add the new leader in the category of hats in 
Golder (Logo Athletic).  On the other hand, Golder subdivided the category of pens to 








suspect, would still be found famous despite their failure to appear in the 
Golder study.  These include Ivory and Palmolive soaps, Camel cigarettes, 
Baker’s cocoa, Crane paper, and B.V.D. underwear.  That leaves fewer than 20 
brands of the original 66 that have simply ceased to exist.      
In the case of the new brand leaders in the Golder study,10 of the 46 
newly leading brands ranked number one in the Golder study had appeared in 
the Hotchkiss study – seven times as the number two brand, twice as number 
three, and once as number six.  Thus in only 36 of the categories was Golder’s 
number one brand completely new to that category.  In three of those 36 cases, 
the Golder number one brand, though absent from the Hotchkiss study in that 
category, had appeared as the number one brand in a different category in the 
Hotchkiss study.60  Finally, of the 33 remaining brands, fourteen were already 
in use in 1920, at the time of the Hotchkiss study, though they did not appear in 
that study.61  Thus only 19 of the 46 brands that were new leaders in the Golder 
study commenced use after the Hotchkiss study.62  
 To the 100 brands we found in the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, we 
added 31 others, for a variety of reasons.  First, we consulted a well-known 
review of internationally famous trademarks by Interbrand, World’s Greatest 
Brands, which rates the strength of hundreds of diverse brands.63  It lists 
                                                 
60  Those brands, listed with the category they newly led in Golder and followed in 
parentheses by the category they led in Hotchkiss, include “Colgate” in toothbrushes  
(toothpaste); “Cross” in pens (leather goods); and “Gillette” in shaving soap (razors). 
61 The date of first use data was gathered from trademark registrations filed with the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
62 Although it is sometimes difficult to obtain accurate information about exactly when 
a particular use of a brand name commenced, it seems clear that some famous uses of 
brand names in our study commenced after the first year of our study, 1940, and of 
those, a few commenced after 1960, a year which we use heavily for comparisons with 
the last year in our study, 2010.  One might well ask whether inclusion of such brand 
names in the study could lead to misleading results, depending on one’s assumptions in 
interpreting study results.  For example, if one were looking at the rates of independent 
uses of these brand names as evidence of potential “free-riding” on the fame of the 
famous uses, it would distort aggregate totals to include independent uses from a year 
in which the famous use had not yet commenced.  And if one were looking at rates of 
independent uses for evidence of legal change that allowed famous users to reduce 
independent uses, it would similarly distort aggregate totals to include independent uses 
from a year in which the famous use had not yet commenced (and hence a year in 
which the famous user could not have had any ability to take legal action to enforce its 
trademark rights).   Yet exclusion of new market leaders identified in the Golder study 
could also be misleading, since declines in independent uses of brand names that no 
longer had a famous use might be misinterpreted as the result of greater legal 
protection, when in fact they had been replaced by independent uses of brand names 
that were new market leaders.  In the face of all of these possibilities, we decided that 
we would include brand names that had more recently gained fame, but would note 
separately the changes in their use rates.  It turns out that these brand names had little 
effect on aggregate totals.  See, for example, footnote 101 below.   






several older U.S. brands whose prominence extended from the 1920’s or 
1930’s.  Where we could confirm longevity of their fame in the Encyclopedia 
of Consumer Brands,64 we added the Interbrand trademarks to our list, 
including such marks as Bacardi, Chanel, IBM, Mercedes-Benz, Rolex, 
Tampax, and Zippo.  Concerned that our list lacked enough of the sort of luxury 
brand names most likely to be the object of independent use, we consulted 
another source, Icons of the American Marketplace,65 to see if we could 
identify any long-lived brands that might have attracted more independent users 
than Ex-Lax or Tampax.  Once again, after checking brand histories, we were 
able to add Cadillac and Harvard. Finally, we included the three iconic brands 
found in the legislative history generated by the passage of the FTDA66 and 
used ubiquitously in examples by commentators:  Buick, Bulova, and Schlitz.67
 In addition to identifying famous marks that have held their fame over 
time, we searched the 1923 study for a number of additional marks that were 
once famous, but no longer dominate the brand marketplace.  We added three 
marks that were famous in 1923, but have since lost their luster:  Fatima 
(cigarettes), Packard (cars), and Uneeda (crackers).68  Here is the resulting list 
of the 131 brand names the uses of which we traced: 
                                                 
64 JANICE JORGENSON (ED), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSUMER BRANDS. 
65 ICONS OF THE AMERICAN MARKETPLACE (2007) (listing the most valuable and 
famous brands in the United States). 
66 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 2-3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1029 (offering Schlitz Varnish, Buick Aspirin, Dupont Shoes, and Kodak 
Pianos as examples). 
67 See MCCARTHY, supra note xx, at 24:105 (“For example, the most popular 
list of offending examples against which antidilution laws are directed is: 
Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz Varnish, Kodak pianos and Bulova 
gowns.”). 
68 In the Hotchkiss and Franken study, “Fatima” was the second most 
recognized brand for cigarettes, behind Camel see HOTCHKISS & FRANKEN, 
supra note xx, at 145; “Packard” was the third most recognized brand name for 
automobiles, behind Ford and Cadillac, see id. at 128; and “Uneeda,” taken by 
itself, was the single most recognized brand for crackers, although Hotchkiss 
and Franken aggregated it with other Nabisco brands and deemed Nabisco the 








  The 131 Brand Names Included in the Study 
 
Aiwa Comet Goodyear Lipton Rolex 
Arbuckle’s 
Yuban Corvette Green Giant London Fog Rolls-Royce 
B. V. D. Crane Guinness Louisville Slugger Royal 
Bacardi Creamette Hammermill Mack Sanka 
Baker’s Crest Hanes Marlboro Schlitz 
Baldwin Crisco Harley-Davidson Mazda Seiko 
Beech-Nut Cross Hart Schaffner & Marx Mennen 
Sherwin-
Williams 
Bic Del Monte Harvard Mercedes-Benz Singer 
Black and 
Decker Dial Heinz Metropolitan Skoal 
Borden Diamond Hershey Nabisco 
Smith and 
Wesson 
Breath-Savers Dole Holeproof Nestle Smucker’s 
Budweiser Douglas Huffy Nike Steinway 
Buick Dove Huyler’s O’Doul’s Stetson 
Bulova Dr. Pepper IBM Old Dutch Sunkist 
Cadillac Eagle Indian Oneida Tampax 
Camel Elgin Iver Johnson Oreo Tide 
Campbell’s Eveready Ivory Packard Tiffany 
Carnation Ex-Lax Jack Daniels Palmolive Totes 
Carter's Fatima Jell-O Perrier Uneeda 
Chanel Fels Naptha Jif Pontiac Victor 
Clabber Girl Folger’s Johnson & Johnson Postum Waterman 
Clorox Ford Kellogg’s Prophylactic Welch’s 
Coach Freightliner Kodak Prudential Winchester 
Coca-Cola 
General 
Electric L’Eggs Remington Windex 
Colgate Gillette Levi Strauss Rit Wrigley 
Colt Gold Medal Life-Savers Rogers Zales 
    Zippo 
 
2. Information Sources, Coding Rules, and Methodology 
a.   Telephone Books as Sources of Brand Name Uses.  The primary 
information sources for our brand name sharing study were white pages 
telephone books (which we will hereafter call simply “telephone books.”)  We 
chose telephone books for a number of reasons.  Over the period of our study, 
we assume that almost all businesses of any size had land line telephone 





telephone number of every land line subscriber in their telephone books without 
additional charge, because the availability of phone numbers encouraged use of 
the telephone.  We assume that very few businesses would have opted for an 
unpublished number, because they wanted customers and potential customers to 
be able to find them easily.  Thus, telephone books should contain reasonably 
comprehensive records of business names in the areas they cover.   
Telephone books also provide snapshots of business name uses in a 
particular year, thus enabling relatively close-grained studies of trends over 
time.  They do so because they are typically issued on an annual basis, and 
because whenever a business ceases to exist or changes its name, the defunct 
listing is removed in the next annual edition of the book.  By comparison, 
trademark registers reflect changes much more slowly, and are therefore 
relatively poor information sources for time studies.  Trademark registrations 
on the federal trademark register, for example, must be first renewed between 
five and six years after initial registration, and thereafter only once every ten 
years;69 before 1989, they only had to be renewed once every twenty years.70  
Thus, unless another business takes affirmative action to have a defunct 
trademark removed from the register on grounds of abandonment, it can remain 
on the federal register for a decade after it has become defunct, and before 1989 
could have remained for two decades. Telephone books are also typically 
issued for particular jurisdictions, which is advantageous because we can 
compare uses over time in a particular area, and use other data about that area 
to aid in analyzing results.71
One limitation of telephone books is that they usually list telephone 
numbers by business name, and not all brand names are business names.  For 
example, four of the brand names in the study – Crest, Comet, Ivory, and Tide 
– are famously used on products made by The Proctor & Gamble Company, not 
by Crest Inc., Comet Inc., Ivory Inc., or Tide, Inc.  Some brand name uses are 
therefore not represented in a telephone book.  While we recognize that 
telephone books are not complete records of brand name uses, the problem is 
likely minor.  Of the 131 brand names in the study, 110 of them, or about 84%, 
appeared in the telephone books we studied as authorized uses, that is, in 
connection with the companies and products for which they are famous.  In 
addition, some companies make it a practice to purchase an extra listing or a 
cross-reference under their most common brand names, so that consumers can 
more easily find them.  Thus, for example, in the telephone books we looked at, 
the Eastman Kodak Company always had a listing under “Kodak” as well as 
“Eastman Kodak.”  Some brand name uses are undoubtedly not represented in 
telephone books, but as far as we know, there is no information source that 
                                                 
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 1058. 
70 See 15 U.S.C § 1058 (1988). 
71 We are aware that individuals and companies outside of the area covered by a 
telephone book have been able to purchase listings in that book.  However, from 
observation we believe that to be a rare enough phenomenon not to significantly distort 
most results, and in any event we believe that the opportunity to purchase out-of-area 







reliably lists all brand name uses in a jurisdiction on a year-to-year basis, so we 
have to live with the limitations of available sources. 
 b. The  Jurisdictions and Years Chosen.  For this study, we decided to 
look at telephone books from two cities, Chicago and Philadelphia, and from 
the borough of Manhattan in New York City.  All three have had very large 
populations and enormous commercial activity over the time period covered by 
the study.  As far as we can tell, they also had stable geographical boundaries 
over that time period.  In addition, we believed that we could easily obtain 
telephone books for these cities over our period of study. 
We ended up looking at telephone books from all three jurisdictions for six 
target years: 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010.  We chose 1940 as a 
baseline year before the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, and 1960 as a 
baseline year before anti-dilution laws should have had much impact.  We then 
tracked uses once every decade beginning in 1980.  
c.  Rules Defining What Counts as a Brand Name Use.   We established a 
detailed set of rules to determine what would count as a use of a brand name.  
The full set of these rules is available as an appendix online; we present the 
most important rules here.   
• Broad definition.  Generally, any name that began with one of 131 brand 
names in the study and that was recognizably the name of a business was 
included.  Thus, “Campbell Joseph Inc.,”  “Campbell Manufacturing Co.,” 
“Campbell Market,” and “Campbell & Brown” would all be counted as 
uses of the brand name “Campbell.”  We also included all instances in the 
singular, plural, and possessive: “Campbell Market,” “Campbell’s Market,” 
and Campbells Market” were all counted. 
• No individual professional listings.  One common type of listing in white 
pages telephone books features the full name of an individual, followed by 
the name of a profession or of goods or services in lower case letters, such 
as “Campbell, Maria F. lawyer” or “Baldwin John G. metal prods.”  In 
earlier telephone books, these listings were numerous and varied; in more 
recent books, they are less frequent, and usually limited to lawyers and 
doctors.  These listings were excluded from the study, on the ground that 
they did not provide enough evidence that the individual’s name was being 
used as a brand name.  
• No alternate spellings or variants.  We did not attempt to track alternate 
spellings of brand names, such as “Douglass,” or “Forde,” or other names 
that looked or sounded similar; only the exact brand names were included.  
This may well result in some undercounting, but a search for all similar 
variants would both require resources that we did not have, as well as 
additional rules for determining similarity that would be very difficult to 
formulate and apply consistently. 
• First word uses only.  We only searched for brand names when they were 
listed as the first word of the company name in the telephone book.  Thus, 
for example, “Flowers by Campbell,” “Brown & Campbell,” and Joseph 
Campbell & Sons” would not be included as uses of the brand name 





their dominant brand name first – there may be listings for “Campbell 
Flowers By” and “Campbell Joseph & Sons” – and in that case they would 
be included. 
• Geographical and Semantic Compounds Excluded.   We did not count the 
occurrence of one of the names in our study as a brand name use when it 
was immediately followed by another word and the two words together 
formed a local place name.  For example, three of the brand names in the 
study are “Douglas,” “Ford” and “Rogers”; Chicago has neighborhoods 
called “Douglas Park” and “Rogers Park,” and a shopping mall called 
“Ford City.”  Many businesses incorporate those complete place names in 
their own names; for example, we came across “Douglas Park Dollar and 
Food,” “Ford City Bowling Center,” and “Rogers Park Fine Wines and 
Spirits.” Following an established rule of trademark law that “unitary 
marks” are to be considered as a whole,72 we decided that each of these 
two-word place names would be experienced as a whole, and we therefore 
did not count uses of them as uses of the brand names “Douglas,” “Ford,” 
and “Rogers.”   
Similarly, some brand names can be used as modifiers in semantic 
compounds.  In our experience, the brand name that was used in this way 
most often was “Cross.” “Cross” is a family name, and the famous use 
which placed it in our study is “Cross Pens,” named after Alonzo 
Townsend Cross, the son of the company’s founder.  However, as a 
modifier, “cross” can also mean “across,” “between” or “covering the 
whole of,” and we found many business named, for example, “Cross 
Country Van Lines,” “Cross Cultural Consulting,” and “Cross Roads 
Travel Service.”  Following the same principle that composites are to be 
taken together, we decided not to count these as uses of the brand name 
“Cross.”  On the same logic, we also did not count such phrases as “Dial A 
Job,”  “Dial A Mattress,” and “Dial a Prayer” as uses of “Dial.” 
• Branches and departments not counted as separate uses.  Many telephone 
books contain multiple telephone number listings for a given business 
name, often because the business has multiple branches in different 
locations in the city, or has a number of different departments under a 
single main listing.  We sometimes kept track of how many branches a 
business had, but for purposes of this study we did not count branches or 
departments as separate brand name uses.  Thus, a business name could 
only count as one use of a brand name in that telephone book, no matter 
how many branches or departments it had.  We did, however, count 
different affiliated companies separately:  for example, “General Electric 
Credit Corp.” and “General Electric X-Ray Corp.” were counted as two 
separate (authorized) brand name uses.  Thus, it is possible for a single 
telephone book to generate more than one authorized use. 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 







d. Information About and Classification of Brand Name Uses.  For each 
brand name use found in a telephone book, a record was created.  Each record 
includes the full name of the use found (e.g. “Campbell Foundry Co.”); the 
brand name of which it is a use (“Campbell”); the city and year of the telephone 
book in which the use was found; and an indication of whether the use was 
“Authorized,” “Independent,” or “Unclear.”73   
A brand name use is “Authorized” if it is a use made by the company that 
made the name famous in the studies we consulted, or by an affliated or 
successor company or a licensee.  A use is also “Authorized” if it is probably a 
nominative use, whether or not it is actually licensed.  For example, “Corvette 
Auto Repairs,” for a business specialized in repairing Chevrolet Corvettes, 
would be considered “Authorized” whether or not the use is licensed by 
General Motors.  Any other use of the brand name as a business name is 
“Independent” – unauthorized by the owner of the famous use of the name and 
not a nominative use of that famous brand.   Making judgments about whether a 
use is authorized or independent when presented only with information 
available in a telephone book may seem a difficult task.  In practice, however, 
we think that in most cases it is possible to make very good guesses.  In part, 
we were aided by the fact that telephone books contain business names, and 
business names are often longer than the brand names of their products – for 
example, the company responsible for making “Heinz” a famous brand name 
for food products is the “H. J. Heinz Company,” not “Heinz Tailors.”  
Telephone books also often contain short descriptions of the lines of business of 
the companies listed, such as “Heinz Mfg Co aluminum extrusions.”  True, 
some companies have become quite diversified, and in a number of cases we 
did additional research that identified that diversification.  For example, the 
company that made “Borden” famous for milk at one time produced a wide 
variety of chemicals, and the company that produced “Colt” guns has 
manufactured many other things as well.74  Nevertheless, we think it unlikely 
that a company such as the H.J. Heinz Co. ever owned a local tailor’s shop, dry 
cleaners, or pharmacy, and thus in practice we are confident that our 
classifications are in very large part accurate.  In those cases where we 
                                                 
7373 Each record also contains a number of fields intended to aid the research process, 
such as a field for noting later modifications of the record, and a field identifying the 
record’s author. 
74 It turned out also to be important to recognize that many of the companies that made 
the brand names in our study famous also built buildings in the cities we studied.  Thus, 
there are or were General Electric, Postum, Rolls-Royce, Singer and Steinway buildings 
in New York; Palmolive, Prudential, and Wrigley buildings in Chicago; and a Packard 
building in Philadelphia. We treated all uses made in connection with those buildings as 
authorized uses.  More recently, a number of automobile companies have participated 
in the revival of the theater district in Chicago, and so the Cadillac Palace Theatre and 
the Ford Center for the Performing Arts are not independent uses, but are officially 
sponsored by the Cadillac Division of General Motors and the Ford Motor Company, 
respectively.  On the other hand, the Pontiac Building in Chicago has never had any 
connection with the Pontiac Division of General Motors, and so the few uses connected 





remained unsure even after additional research, we marked the use “Unclear,” 
and did not count it as either an “Authorized” use or an “Independent” one.  
Between two and three percent of the uses landed in the “Unclear” category.  
 e. Methodology.  The initial database entries were made by student 
research assistants, who were instructed as to the rules for inclusion and 
classification of brand name uses.  Robert Brauneis then personally checked 
every database entry against the original sources, and made several thousand 
changes, including additions, deletions, and modifications.  In some cases, 
issues that we had not anticipated arose as the work was done, and we 
formulated and distributed additional rules. 
 
III.  INDEPENDENT USES OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
STUDY RESULTS. 
 
 This Part of the article will summarize the results of the empirical 
study.  Because the study is concerned primarily with the sharing of brand 
names, we will focus mainly on uses of the brand names that were independent 
of the famous uses of those names.  We will first consider totals across all 
brand names, cities, and years, and then analyze the data by type of brand 
name, by city, and by year. 
 
A.  Totals.     
 
In total, in the six years and three cities covered by our study, we 
identified 14,249 uses of the study’s 131 brand names.  Of these, 1221 were 
“authorized” uses, 12,779 were “independent” uses, and 249 were “unclear.”  
Thus, each brand name had an average of 109 uses, of which about 9 were 
authorized, 98 were independent, and two were unclear.75  Those averages, 
however, mask a very wide variation between brand names.  Although each 
brand name generated on average 98 independent uses, the median number of 
independent uses per brand name was only 9; 33 of the 131 brand names 
generated zero independent uses, 59 of the brand names less than 5 uses, and 71 
of the brand names less than 18, or less than one per telephone book.76  Only 25 
brand names generated more than the average number of 98 independent uses.  
The brand name “Royal” accounted for the most independent uses, 2086 or 
16.32% of the total; second came “Metropolitan,” with 1583 uses, 12.39% of 
the total.  Rounding out the top five were “Diamond,” 1170 uses and 9.16%; 
“Eagle,” 1069 uses and 8.37%; and “Baker,” 674 uses and 5.27%.77  These top 
five together account for 51.51% of all independent uses. 
 This may seem like an extraordinary concentration of uses in a very 
few brand names, but concentration on that order is not unusual.  Indeed, in the 
study undertaken by George Kingsley Zipf, discussed above,78 the distribution 
                                                 
75 [from spreadsheet Author Ct + Cell Check] 
76 [from spreadsheet CountsTotalRankByCity  rows 135-139] 
77 [from spreadsheet CountsTotalRankByCity] 







of brand name uses was concentrated even more tightly in the most popular 
names, roughly following what has become known as “Zipf’s Law.”  The 
distribution of frequency of use among brand names in our sample does not 
quite fit Zipf’s Law, because the curve is flatter – for example, the number of 
uses of the second-most-prevalent brand name is 76% of the number of uses of 
the most-prevalent name, and the number of uses of the third-most-prevalent 
brand name is 74% of the number of uses of the second-most-prevalent name.  
However, the distribution still shows a great deal of concentration, and the fact 
that the curve is flatter could just mean that the sample does not contain the 
most frequently used brand names in the United States, which is quite likely.79
 
B.   Types of Brand Names.    
 
Brand names can be classified in numerous ways.  When studying 
words, linguists often consider four different components: phonology, 
orthography, morphology, and semantics.80  With respect to brand names, one 
could consider how variations of each of these components correlated with rates 
of sharing. We will not consider here matters of phonology – of how brand 
names sound – or of orthography – of how brand names are spelled.  We will, 
however, consider some aspects of morphology – or of how brand names are 
formed – and of semantics – of what brand names mean.  Specifically, we will 
consider rates of sharing of three different groups of brand names:  (1) single 
lexical words, that is to say, words that have a meaning defined in 
dictionaries;81 (2) family names – names that occurred in the telephone books 
we studied as family names of individuals; and (3) words that fit into neither of 
the first two categories, because they are acronyms or compound, derived, 
coined, or foreign words. 
1.  Lexical Words.   Twenty-five of the 131 brand names in the study, 
or 19% of those names, are lexical words.  Though they account for a roughly 
proportionate share of authorized uses (20.29%), they account for 68.90% of 
the independent uses.82    The top five brand names – Royal, Metropolitan, 
Eagle, Diamond, Baker, and Victor – are all lexical words. Although Royal, 
Eagle and Diamond are found as family names, Royal and Eagle are quite 
uncommon as family names, and Diamond is only moderately common.83  
                                                 
79 For example, American, United, National, and Acme were not among the 131 brands 
studied. 
80 See Tina M. Lowrey, L.J. Shrum & Tony M. Dubitsky, The Relation Between Brand-
Name Linguistic Characteristics and Brand-Name Memory, 32 J. OF ADVERTISING 7 
(2003) 
81 Linguists often use the term “generic word” as a synonym for “lexical word,” but we 
have chosen to avoid the word “generic” in this context because of its prominence and 
different meaning in trademark law. 
82 [from spreadsheet CountsLexicalRankByCity] 
83 We counted individual residential listings for all brand names in the 1960 and 2010 
telephone books.  We found 60 of the 131 brand names in the study as family names in 
those individual residential listings.  The total number of residential listings featuring 





Thus, Baker is the first name on the list that probably owes much of its 
frequency to its use as a family name.84  Only two lexical words, 
“prophylactic” and “skoal,” generated no independent uses at all.  One can only 
guess that in the former case, the fact that “prophylactic” has become a 
euphemism for “condom” is a great deterrent to its use as a brand name (and 
likely played a role in the demise of the once-famous brand of toothbrush).  In 
the latter case, the relative obscurity of the imported term85 and its use in 
connection with chewing tobacco are probable factors.  Twenty-two of the 
other 23 lexical words generated at least the median number of nine 
independent uses, and 14 of them generated more than the average number of 
98 independent uses.  It should be no surprise that a lexical word is more likely 
to be adopted by multiple independent entities as a brand name, but these 
figures give some sense of the magnitude of increased likelihood.  
2.  Family names.   Sixty of the 131 brand names, or about 46%, were 
found as family names in at least one telephone book in our study in 1960 or 
2010.   Some of them, such as Campbell, Carter, Baker, Ford and Rogers, were 
quite common, and others, such as Chanel, Comet, Crest, Huyler, and Smucker, 
were exceedingly uncommon.86  This list would have been longer had we not 
made a judgment call about brand names that consist of two or more personal 
                                                                                                                       
found family name, accounted for 1905 listings or 15.29% of the total, and the top five 
names accounted for 60% of the total.  “Diamond,” with 435 listings, accounted for 
3.5% of the total; “Royal,” with 52 listings, accounted for 0.42% of the total; and 
“Eagle,”with 37 listings, accounted for 0.30% of the total. 
84 “Baker” was the third-most-frequently found name among the 60 family names we 
found in the 1960 telephone books, with 1517 listings accounting for 12.18% of the 
total. 
85 Of all of the 25 lexical word brand names, “skoal” occurs least frequently in the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English, appearing only 49 times.  “Prophylactic” is 
the third least-frequent, at 279 uses, with “carnation,” at 229 uses, in between.  By 
contrast “royal,” for example, occurs 12,629 times.  See Corpus of Contemporary 
American English, http://www.americancorpus.org.  We checked to see whether there 
was any correlation, either negative or positive, between the rate of sharing of a lexical 
brand name and its frequency of use in English, as measured in the Corpus of 
Contemporary English.   It turns out the relationship is almost so weak as to be random: 
a regression resulted in an R Square value of 0.0109 and a p-value of 0.6192. 
86 Five other brand names in our study appear as (very rare) family names in the 2000 
United States Census, although we did not find them in any of the telephone books we 
searched: Crisco, Mennen, Oneida, Sanka, and Zippo.  Three brand names were in fact 
the family names of the company founders, but appear neither in the 2000 United States 
Census nor in the telephone books we consulted: Bacardi, Bulova, and Nestlé.  
Although “O’Doul” sounds like an Irish name, it in fact does not exist in Ireland, and 
was apparently invented by the father of American baseball player Lefty O’Doul, who 
changed his name from Doul.  See http://everything2.com /title/Lefty+O%2527Doul.  
As a result, there are exceedingly few people bearing the family name O’Doul, and it 
does not appear in the 2000 United States Census.  Other brand names were derived 
from the family name(s) of the founder(s)  through clipping – “Baron Bich” became 
“Bic” – amending  -- Charles William Post made “Postum” – or abbreviation – 







names strung together.  Eleven of the brand names in our study fit that 
description: Black and Decker, Harley-Davidson, Hart Schaffner & Marx, Iver 
Johnson, Jack Daniels, Johnson & Johnson, Levi Strauss, Mercedes-Benz, 
Rolls-Royce, Sherwin-Williams, and Smith and Wesson.  We decided that in 
four of those cases, the first name in the string was used often enough by itself 
to identify the brand that it would be useful to track it separately.  Those 
include Harley, Levi, Mercedes, and Rolls.  In the remaining cases, we 
concluded, it was not useful to track any of the names by themselves, since 
Smith and Wesson guns, for example, are never known as “Smiths,” nor are 
Black and Decker flashlights known as “Blacks.”  
There is a substantial overlap between family names and lexical words: 
Eighteen brand names in the study fall within both the group of 25 that are 
lexical words and the group of 60 that are family names.  Therefore, it may be 
useful to consider those both together with and separately from the family 
names that are not lexical words.87  Of the 12,925 independent uses of the 
brand names in the study, 10,344, or 81%, were uses of names that we also 
found as family names.88  However, 7060 of those uses were of the 18 names 
that were also lexical words, whereas only 3284 of those uses were of the 42 
names that are not lexical words.   As we mentioned above, while some of the 
names that are lexical words probably have high rates of sharing due to their 
use as family names – Baker, Victor, and Singer are prominent among these – 
others, such as Royal, Eagle, and Crest, are less likely to own much of their 
popularity to such use.  Of the 42 brand names that are family names but not 
lexical words, the top six collectively account for 60% of the 3284 uses of 
names that fall under that description.  Those names, which are all relatively 
common family names, are Rogers, Campbell, Carter, Douglas, Mack, and 
Baldwin.  We will have more to say about the correlation between the rate of 
family name use and the rate of brand name use in Part IV below. 
3.   Acronyms and Compound, Derived, Coined and Foreign Words.   
Forty-two of the 131 brand names in the study are neither single lexical words 
nor family names.  Twelve are compound names, formed by juxtaposing two 
lexical words, such as “Breath-Savers,” “General Electric,” “Gold Medal,” 
“London Fog,” or “Old Dutch.”   Twenty-six would probably qualify under 
modern trademark doctrine as “coined” or “fanciful” words.  Some of these are 
quite recognizably formed from lexical words by processes of derivation, 
blending, or clipping: thus “Windex” is a brand of window cleaner, 
“Palmolive” a brand of soap, and “Ex-Lax” a brand of laxative.  Others have 
little perceptible relationship to any lexical word: “Bic,” “Kodak,” and “Oreo,” 
for example, are unlikely to call any particular meaning to mind.  Two brand 
names, “B.V.D.” and “IBM,” are acronyms, and another two, “Aiwa” and 
“Seiko,” are of foreign – in this case Japanese – derivation.89    
                                                 
87 A family name that is also a lexical word would, for example, be unlikely to qualify 
as “primarily merely a surname” under federal trademark law.  See 15 U.S.C. §2(e)(4).  
88 See spreadsheet [CountsBrandNamesSurnames] 
89 Under the “doctrine of foreign equivalents” of U.S. trademark law, foreign terms 





Only four of these 42 brand names ever generated a substantial number 
of independent uses.  Those four were Eveready (97 uses), Uneeda (66 uses) 
Gold Medal (49 uses), and Old Dutch (32 uses).90  Of those, however, only 
Gold Medal has remained relatively steady, with 10 independent uses in 1960 
and 8 in 2010.  Eveready dropped from 21 independent uses in 1960 to 6 in 
2010; Uneeda from 27 independent uses in 1960 to 2 in 2010; and Old Dutch 
from 12 in 1960 to one in 2010.91   
Of the other 38 brand names in those categories, 20 never generated a 
single independent use, and in 2010, 34 of the 38 names had zero independent 
uses and the other four only had one.  It is clear, then, either that most coined 
names are simply not attractive to would-be imitators, or that they enjoy broad 
trademark protection, and those who have coined them take advantage of that 
protection.  
C.   Cities.    Of the 12,779 independent uses found in the study, 6687, 
or 52%, were found in Manhattan; 4040 (32%) were found in Chicago, and 
2052 (16%) were found in Philadelphia.92  Thus, Manhattan generated by far 
the largest number of independent uses, even though over the time period 
covered by the study, the population of Chicago was much larger, and that of 
Philadelphia began modestly larger and ended modestly smaller.  In 1940, 
Manhattan had a population of 1,889,924, whereas Chicago had a population of 
3,396,808 and Philadelphia a population of 1,913,334; 93 by 2009, the estimated 
population of Manhattan was 1,629,054,94 while the estimated population of 
Chicago in 2006 was 2,833,321,95 and the 2006 estimated population of 
Philadelphia was 1,448,394.96  The greater number of independent uses per 
capita in Manhattan probably reflects the fact that Manhattan is the business 
center of a metropolitan area that is substantially larger than that of Chicago or 
Philadelphia. 
                                                                                                                       
the case of “Seiko,” however, that seems unlikely to lead to a single definite meaning; 
according to Seiko’s official company history, the word means “exquisite,” “minute,” 
or “success,” see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seiko, whereas as a girl’s name, it means 
“sincere child.”  See 
http://babynamesworld.parentsconnect.com/meaning_of_Seiko.html.  
90 See spreadsheet [CountsDerivedByYear] 
91 Id. 
92 See [spreadsheet CountsTotalAlphaByCity]. 
93 For the populations of Chicago and Philadelphia, see Campbell Gibson, Population of 
the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the Unites States: 1790 to 1990, U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Population Division Working Paper No. 27 (1998), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html; for 
the population of Manhattan, which is New York County in the State of New York, see 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/cencounts/index.html.    
94 See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, New York County, New York, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36061.html. 
95 See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, Chicago (city), Illinois, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html. 








D.  Time.   The most dramatic perspective on the independent use data 
gathered in this study may be that of change over time.  Across all three 
jurisdictions, the number of independent uses increased between 1940 to 1960, 
from 2293 to 3000, an increase of 31%.  Thereafter, however, independent uses 
steadily declined: 2456 in 1980; 2033 in 1990; 1617 in 2000; and 1380 in 
2010.97  Thus, between 1960 and 2010, independent uses declined by 54%.  
Although there is some variation between the study’s three jurisdictions, they 
follow the same basic trend.  Chicago posted the largest percentage decline, 
60%, from 938 to 374 uses.  Philadelphia declined by 51%, for 483 uses to 235 
uses, and Manhattan also declined by 51%, from 1579 uses to 771 uses.98  
These changes are graphically represented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
Independent Uses of 131 Brand Names in Three Jurisdictions, 
1940-201099
 
These declines were spread broadly across the 131 brand names in the study.  
Only 15 of the 131 names had a greater number of independent uses in 2010 
than in 1960.  Of those, eight were merely increases from zero uses to one use, 
and the others all involved brand names with relatively low numbers of 
independent uses.100  The largest single gain was posted by the brand name 
                                                 
97 See [spreadsheet Timechart] 
98 See [spreadsheet Timechart] 
99 The numbers for 1950 are averages of those for 1940 and 1960, rather than being 
based on empirical research; similarly, the numbers for 1970 are averages of the 
numbers for 1960 and 1980.  They were inserted to maintain a uniform time scale 
across the figure. 





“Tiffany,” which had six independent uses in 1960 and 19 in 2010, a gain of 
13.101  Meanwhile, 71 of the 131 brand names, which collectively accounted for 
98.47% of the independent uses in 1960 and 93.62% of the independent uses in 
2010, saw declines in such uses.102  Forty-five of the 131 names had zero 
independent uses in both 1960 and 2010; these accounted for all of the names 
the number of uses of which remained the same.103  Thus, the last half-century 
saw a broad, steep decline in the number of independent uses of the famous 
brand names represented in this study.  We now turn to the task of examining 
why this change occurred. 
 
IV.  NON-LEGAL CAUSES OF THE DECLINE IN INDEPENDENT USES OF BRAND 
NAMES 
 
Part I of this Article explained that over the past five or six decades, 
trademark infringement protection has expanded and trademark dilution 
protection has arisen, giving owners of trademark rights in brand names, 
especially famous brand names, additional powers to prevent sharing of those 
names.  Part III of this Article showed, among other things, that independent 
uses of the 131 brand names tracked in an empirical study have declined 
sharply and broadly over that same time period.  One might conclude that 
increased trademark protection was entirely or largely responsible for the 
decline.  The truth, however, is likely to be more complicated.  First, many 
other factors may be at play, and it is important to consider what they might be, 
and to see whether we can estimate their likely influence.  Second, the effect of 
legal change is likely to emerge incrementally in the market, so we must 
consider how quickly changes in law could have an effect on brand name 
sharing rates, and which brand name users could take advantage of those legal 
changes.  We will consider the role of trademark law in the next Part.  This Part 
will investigate three possible non-legal factors that could affect brand-name 
sharing rates:  1) economic changes in the municipalities studied;  2) family 
migration, which is made relevant by the many family names represented 
among the 131 names in our study; and  3)  the possible decline in popularity 
over time of the brands studied.   It will also briefly consider two other possible 
non-legal factors--structural shifts in the popularity of business name types and 




                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.  As far as we can tell, seven of the 131 brand names in the study had famous uses 
that commenced after 1960: Aiwa, Bic, Breath-Savers, Coach, L’Eggs, Nike, and 
O’Douls.  Of these, five had no independent uses in either 1960 or 2010.  Coach had 
four independent uses in 1960, and six in 2010; Nike had zero independent uses in 
1960, and one in 2010.  Thus, these brand names had very little effect on the aggregate 







A.  Economic Changes.   
  
It is possible that the total number of businesses operating in the three 
jurisdictions in the study declined between 1960 and 2010.  If that were true 
(assuming a stable distribution of brand names among those businesses), the 
number of businesses that shared any one brand name would decrease.  Most 
obviously, the economies of the cities in question may have shrunk, resulting in 
a decline in the number of businesses.  Second, the average size of the 
businesses in those cities may have increased and displaced multiple smaller 
businesses.  For example, many independent pharmacies may have been 
replaced by branches of a single company that operates pharmacies under one 
brand name, such as Walgreens, CVS, or Rite Aid.  For the year 1960, the 
project database contains 12 names of businesses that begin with one of the 131 
brand names in the study and end with words like “Pharmacy,” “Pharmacists,” 
“Druggist,” or “Drug Store”; by 2010, that number has dropped to six.104  That 
decline may well be attributable to consolidation, rather than economic 
shrinkage or legal change.  Another related possibility is that independently 
branded businesses were replaced by franchises that are independently owned 
but operated under a single brand name, such as Seven-Eleven, Burger King, or 
Holiday Inn.105
                                                 
104 See [spreadsheet BusinessTypes] 
105 Many franchisors operate on a mixed basis, owning some of the locations that use 
the brand name, and licensing the brand name to owners of other locations.  For a report 
on the top 200 franchisors and the percentage of locations to which each of them 
licenses the brand name through a franchise agreement, see Franchise Times, Franchise 






 Given limitations on available economic data,106 we decided to return 
to the telephone books and use the number of overall business listings as a 
proxy for both economic shrinkage and business consolidation.   We estimated 
the total number of brand name uses that appeared in the 1960 and 2010 white 
pages telephone books in all three jurisdictions.  If the total number of brand 
name uses in the telephone books exhibited the same percentage decline as did 
the independent uses of the 131 brand names in our study, then the decline of 
independent uses would seem to be explained by some combination of 
economic contraction, economic concentration, or franchising activity.  
Unfortunately, it is not easy to count or accurately estimate the total 
number of brand name uses in white pages telephone books.  Counting is an 
extremely labor-intensive process: the telephone books in the study have on 
average about 1300 pages, and each page has upwards of 400 listings.  We 
simply did not have the resources to undertake an actual count.  An accurate 
estimate is also tricky.  Most of the telephone books mix residential and 
business listings in alphabetical order.  The mix is very “lumpy” – pages listing 
popular family names can contain almost entirely residential listings, pages 
listing popular business names or acronyms can contain almost entirely 
business listings, and one can find pages with a wide variety of residential to 
                                                 
106 Economic censuses have been conducted in the United States since 1810, but they 
have two limitations that impede their usefulness for this project.  First, before 1948, 
regular economic censuses were limited for the most part to manufacturing industries, 
and thus excluded economic activity in retail, wholesale, transportation, 
communication, and other service industries. See William F. Micarelli, Evolution of the 
United States Economic Censuses: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 15 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 335, 358 (1998).  In 1948, the Bureau of the 
Census conducted the first census of the retail and wholesale trades, and of selected 
service industries, but this census continued to exclude some service industries that are 
particularly important to large cities, including the finance, insurance, and real estate 
industries.  Those industries were not added until 1992, when a large expansion of the 
scope of the economic census enabled it to cover industries accounting for 98% of the 
gross domestic product of the United States, expanded from about 75% of GDP in 
1987. See id. at 372; Paul T. Zeisset, Disseminating Economic Census Data, 15 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 303, 314 (1998).   Because the scope of the 
economic census excluded a substantial percentage of economic activity until 1992, it is 
difficult to use census data to make historical comparisons regarding businesses of all 
types before that year. 
Second, the basic unit of the economic census is the “establishment,” defined 
as “a business or industrial unit at a single geographic location that produces or 
distributes goods or services—for example, a factory, store, or hotel.” Shirin A. Ahmed, 
Lawrence A. Blum & Mark E. Wallace, Conducting the Economic Census, 15 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION QUARTERLY 275, 280 (1998).   The key here is the idea of 
a “unit at a single geographic location”; many establishments may be owned by the 
same company, or a company may only own a single establishment.  The economic 
census does not provide information about company or firm ownership of 
establishments at the city level.  Therefore, we cannot draw conclusions about 








business ratios in between those two extremes.  Nor is it easy to generate a 
random sample, since each telephone book has a different number of pages and 
the number of listings per page varies widely, since some listings take up more 
space on the page than others. 
We settled on counting the number of brand name uses on telephone 
book pages that covered the alphabetical range from approximately Bac to Ban, 
and then extrapolating from those results.  This alphabetical range seemed not 
to be uncharacteristically dominated by either business or residential listings – 
it did not contain a business name like “American,” or a family name like 
“Smith” – but we must admit that we lack a means for testing whether it is 
closely representative of the entire book.   This alphabetical range occupies as 
many as ten pages in the 1960 Manhattan telephone book (which mixes 
residential and business listings), but only a single page in the 2010 Chicago 
and Philadelphia books (which have separate sections for residential and 
business listings, although the business section still contains many individual 
professional listings that we did not count as brand name uses).   
The estimates so generated suggest that the total number of brand name 
uses represented in the telephone books did indeed decline between 1960 and 
2010, as shown in Table 1.   
 
TABLE 1 














































42273 483 36581 267 -13.46% -51.35% 
 
  However, Table 1 also shows that independent uses of the brand 
names in our study declined far more dramatically than brand names generally, 
and that the relationship between the two types of decline varies widely.  In 
Philadelphia, independent uses of studied brand names declined at a bit less 
than four times the rate of the total decline, whereas in Chicago the studied 
                                                 
107 For independent use data, see [spreadsheet TimeChart]; for estimated total brand 






brand name uses declined at over seven times the rate of the total decline.  
Thus, it seems quite clear that the declines we observed in independent uses of 
the studied brand names are not just a function of overall declines, and that we 
need to consider other factors. 
 
B.  Surname Uses and Family Migration. 
 
As noted above, we found 60 of the 131 brand names in our study, or 
about 46% of those names, in use as surnames in the residential listings of 
Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia.  Uses of those names as brand names, 
however, accounted for about 81% of the independent brand name uses in those 
three cities in 1960.108  Moreover, the rate of decline of surname brand uses 
closely tracked the overall decline in independent uses – 53.73% versus 54.00% 
-- so that the percentage of surname uses remained stable, rising less than one 
half of one percent from 1960 to 2010.109  Thus, changes in independent brand 
name use rates might be tied to changes in the Chicago, Manhattan, and 
Philadelphia populations of those bearing the surnames represented in the 
study.   
To provide a basis for testing this hypothesis, we counted the number 
of residential listings for each of the 60 surnames in the 1960 and 2010 
telephone books in each of the three cities.  The aggregate results are displayed 
in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
 
Surname Listings Counts and Surname Brand Name Uses 























































Philadelp 3625 438 3031 209 -16.39% -52.28% 
                                                 
108 See [spreadsheet Surname Correl 3] 
109 See id. 
110 The figures for the Surname Brand Uses are from [spreadsheet Surname Correl 3]; 
the figures for surname listings are summarized on [spreadsheet Surname Correl 3], and 








TOTAL 12458 2440 9528 1129 -23.52% -53.73% 
 
If we examine the totals, aggregating the figures from all three cities, it 
appears as though there is a reasonably strong correlation between the change 
in the number of telephone listings of residents with one of the 60 studied 
surnames and the change in number of uses of those surnames as independent 
brand names.  The telephone listings of residents of the three cities with one of 
the 60 surnames dropped 23.52% from 1960 to 2010, while the number of 
independent brand name uses of those surnames dropped 53.73%.  Although it 
would be unreasonable to think that the decrease in listings could account for 
the entire decrease in independent brand name uses – each resident listed in the 
phone book could not be responsible for two businesses – it could still account 
for a large portion of the decrease.111  The reality, however, is more complex.  
The three cities experienced similar decreases in independent brand name uses 
of the 60 surnames; they ranged from about 50% in Manhattan to about 59% in 
Chicago, a difference of only 9%.   The variation in decreases of surname 
listings was, however, much greater.  Manhattan lost only 5.08% of its 60-
surname listings, while Philadelphia lost 16.39%, over three times as much, and 
Chicago lost a whopping 39.13%, almost eight times as much.112   Since the 
cities’ losses in both categories follow the same rank order, the data still 
suggest the possibility of a linear, causal relationship between loss in 
population and loss in brand name use, but a much smaller one.   One would 
                                                 
111 The decrease in residential listings could represent a substantially larger drop in 
population if the national averages for change in household size and change in 
percentage of households that had wireline telephone numbers held for all three cities.  
Between 1960 and 2008, the national average household size decreased from 3.29 to 
2.62, while the percentage of households with telephone service increased from 74% to 
95%.  See Douglas Galbi, U.S. Historical Telephone Statistics, with economy-wide 
employment structure data, all-summary spreadsheet, 
http://galbithink.org/telcos/historical-telephone-stats.xls.  On the other hand, by 2008, 
20.2% of U.S. households had wireless-only telephone service.  Id.  If, as is most likely 
the case, those wireless numbers are not listed in white pages telephone books, while 
the wireline numbers largely are, then the percentage of households with listed numbers 
has remained close to flat between 1960 and 2008.  Thus, we would really only need to 
correct for household size.  Applying such a correction, the percentage decrease in 
population of the 60 surnames in the study would be 39.79% rather than 23.52%.  (We 
do not know whether there has been a change in the percentage of wireline numbers 
that are unlisted, and if so, how large that change is.) 
112By comparison, Manhattan’s total population in 2010 was 4.08% lower than its 
population in 1960; Philadelphia’s was 27.72% lower; and Chicago’s was 19.64% 
lower.  See U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census Statistics On Population Totals By 
Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For Large Cities And Other 
Urban Places In The United States, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.html;  






have to attribute the bulk of the decreases – 49% -- to other causes, and as for 
the rest, it would take a loss of about 4% in residential surname listings to cause 
a loss of one further percent of independent brand name uses of the 
surnames.113  
 Surname Ratio Comparisons and the Factor of Race.  If we look at the 
data in even more detail, we see further complications.  The ratio of residential 
listings to brand name uses varies widely between surnames.  With many of the 
surnames, this could be a function of the very small numbers of both resident 
listings and brand name uses.  However, seven of the surnames had at least 100 
residential listings in each city in both 1960 and 2010, and so might possibly 
exhibit somewhat more regularity.  We looked at the residential listing to brand 
name use ratio for each of those seven surnames: Baker, Campbell, Carter, 
Douglas, Ford, Mack, and Rogers.  In 1960, Manhattan had ratios ranging from 
5.13 residential listings to one brand name use (Baker) to 11.06 residential 
listings to one brand name use (Mack); Chicago’s range was from 6.02 to 1 
(Douglas) to 28.36 to 1 (Carter); and Philadelphia’s range was from 8.78 to 1 
(Baker) to 47.46 to 1 (Carter).114  Those ratios all significantly increased by 
2010, and there was some change in the relative place of surnames as well.   
We suspect that one factor that can explain much of these disparities is 
the possible lower rate of business formation by disadvantaged minority 
residents.  The only information currently available on the race of holders of 
common surnames is from the United States Census for the year 2000.  It 
shows that there is a substantial variation in the percentages of various races 
that hold the surnames in our study.  For example, 82.08% of people with the 
surname “Baker” reported that they were white – the highest percentage of any 
of the seven surnames on which we focused.   By contrast, only 60.51% of 
those with the surname “Carter,” and 47.35% of those with the surname 
“Mack,” reported that they were white, the two lowest percentages from among 
the seven surnames.   It is very unlikely to be coincidence, then, that in all three 
cities, in both 1960 and 2010, “Baker” has a substantially lower ratio of 
residential listings to brand name uses than “Carter” or “Mack.”  In other 
words, Bakers were both more likely to be white and more likely to be business 
owners than Carters or Macks. 
In some cases, the ranking of residential listing / brand name use ratios 
parallels the ranking of surnames by the percentages of white holders of those 
names almost exactly.  One example is 1960 Manhattan data for the seven top 
surnames, on which we ran regression analyses.  A regression equation that 
uses the number of residential listings as the sole independent variable and 
number of brand name uses as the dependent variable produces an R Square of 
.5977, and a p-value for the independent variable of .0415.  That means, 
roughly, that the variation in residential listings amounts for about 59% of the 
variation in brand name uses, and there is only a four percent chance that the 
two variables are unrelated.  If we add the 2000 Census percentages of white 
                                                 
113 See the summary output of the regression on line 49 of spreadsheet Surname Correl 
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holders of each surname as a second variable, the R Square climbs to .9352, 
accounting for 93% of the variation in brand name uses, and the p value for the 
white holder percentages is a low .0103, but the p value for the residential 
listing numbers climbs to .2957.  In other words, the brand name uses are 
actually correlated more tightly with the racial distribution of surname use then 
they are with the numbers of residents in Manhattan. 115
The correlations are not quite as close with other years and cities, but it 
is also likely that the racial distributions of the surnames in the study are not 
nationally uniform or uniform across time, and so they may diverge 
substantially from the 2000 Census figures that are available.  In the absence of 
more local information, we cannot come to more precise conclusions about the 
influence of race, but we have good reason to suspect that it is a substantial 
factor. 
In sum, family migration has likely played some role in the decline of 
rates of brand-name sharing of the 60 brand names in our study that are also 
family names, and since uses of those brand names represent over 80% of all 
uses in our study, they have an impact on overall figures as well.  However, 
given the wide difference between losses of the 60-surname population in the 
three cities, and the much smaller difference in losses of uses of those names as 
brand names, it appears that the family migration can only account for 
somewhere between two and twelve percent of the brand-name losses, which 
still leaves a large amount that must be attributed to other factors. 
 
C.  Variable Attractiveness of Brand Names Over Time 
 
Advocates of broad protection for trademarks assert that second comers 
are attracted to successful marks and wish to appropriate the luster of the mark 
in order to increase business.116  If this were true, then one would expect to see 
                                                 
115 For the regression results, see [spreadsheet Surname Correl T7 1960-2010 line 38]  
Because some of the surnames are also used as given names, we also looked at 
information about the historical incidence of baby names, gathered from social security 
records.  For example, in a sample of 666392 social security records between 1920 and 
1929, there were no children named “Baker” or “Campbell,” but there were 43 boys 
names “ Ford,” 50 named  “Carter,” 310 named “Mack,” 941 named “Douglas,” and 
1327 named “Rogers.”  See Douglas Galbi, Most Popular Given Names, US 1801-
1999, http://www.galbithink.org/names/us200.htm.  (We chose the decade 1920-1929 
because we figured that business owners in 1960 would have been given their first 
names, on average, several decades earlier.)  However, this variable did not do well as 
an addition to the regression equation; it increased the R Square by less than two one-
hundredths of one percent, and had a p-value of .7837.  See [spreadsheet Surname 
Correl T7 1960-2010 line 38].  In other words, it seems that very few people were 
naming businesses after their given names.    
116 See e.g. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 
U.S. 203 (1942). (“The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the 
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true 
that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which 





a correlation between the popularity of a brand and the number of subsequent 
independent users of the brand name.  In other words, CADILLAC, a more 
successful brand prior to the Japanese auto invasion, should have been a less 
attractive target for appropriation in the 2000’s.117  One would expect to see a 
decline in independent uses over a time period that correlated with the brand’s 
decline in popularity. In fact, of the 53 total independent uses of CADILLAC 
after 1950 (almost all in Manhattan), 21 occurred in 1950, 26 in 1960, and only 
one occurred in 2005. 
In several graphs below, we attempt to estimate the variation in 
popularity of 37 of our 131 brands by tracking how often the brand name is 
mentioned yearly in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and the 
Washington Post at regular intervals from 1960-2005.118  The list of brands 
comes from an upcoming study of trademark dilution, measuring independent 
uses of brand names in non-telephone databases, including newspapers, state 
corporate/llc name databases, and trademark registers.  For that study we 
selected 37 of the 131 marks that seemed most entitled to protection from 
trademark dilution.  We dropped common surnames like Baker, Campbell, 
                                                                                                                       
wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to 
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial 
symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same--to convey through the 
mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon 
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If 
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the 
owner can obtain legal redress.”).  The House report on proposed anti-dilution 
legislation state that the new cause of action would “recognize[ ] the substantial 
investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the 
mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own 
gain.”  See House Rep. No. 104-374 at 3 (1995).  See also Anne LaLonde, Don't I 
Know You From Somewhere? Protection In The United States Of Foreign Trademarks 
That Are Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1416 (2008) 
(“Famous marks are particularly attractive to free riders . . . seeking to capitalize on the 
financial investment of the mark owner. Copying a famous mark, the Federal Circuit 
recognizes, gives free riders immediate recognition and substantially-reduced 
advertising costs.”); Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination Of The 
Ability Of A Trademark Owner To Recover An Infringer's Profits Under The Lanham 
Act As Amended In 1999, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 292 (2008) (“[I]t is “famous 
marks” that are the ideal target for cybersquatters and “free-riders” since “famous 
marks. . . are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind” and are 
thus more attractive as targets for would-be copyists.”), citing Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 
F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
117 Cadillac sales plummeted in the last 25 years.  As a percentage of the total US car 
market, Cadillac sales constituted only 1.2% in 2008.  See Ward’s Automotive 
Yearbook 251 (2009).  Percentage in prior years include: 2003 (1.3%), 1998 (2.2%), 
1993 (2.4%), 1987 (3.7%), 1982 (4.3%), 1977 (4.0%), and 1972 (3.1%).  See 
respectively Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 242 (2004), 250 (1999), 204 (1994), 156 
(1988), 70 (1983), 70 (1983), and 71 (1983). 








Carter, and Douglas, and omitted common word names like Royal, 
Metropolitan, Eagle, and Diamond, to focus on those marks that we thought 
courts would be most likely to protect from independent uses.119  In other 
words, we chose a list of marks that should have benefited most clearly from 










































First, we should note that our sub-set of 37 marks followed the same 
general decline in independent uses as the full set of 131 marks, although the 
















This decline in independent uses is driven strongly by three brands:  
CADILLAC, PACKARD, and UNEEDA.  In the graph below, we also include 
                                                 
119 Because of the “substantial exclusivity” factor, owners of marks like Baker, 
Campbell, Carter, Douglas, Royal, Metropolitan, Eagle, and Diamond have had little 
luck asserting rights under state or federal dilution statutes.  See 4 J. THOMAS 





HARVARD, which shows little change, as the most important other mark 















In order to determine whether the 37 famous marks also suffered a 
decline in attractiveness/popularity during the same 50-year period, we tracked 
each mark for one-year periods, four times per decade, from 1960 to 2005 in 
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, e.g. in 1960, 
1963, 1965, 1968.  We counted every time a brand name was mentioned as an 
approximate measure of the extent to which the brand was in the public 
consciousness in a particular year.  Prominence in major newspapers is 
obviously a very rough proxy for brand popularity, but we note that courts and 
brand owners have long counted “consumer impressions” as a measure of brand 
consciousness120 and even as a way to measure secondary meaning (mark 
strength) in trademark litigation.121  Advertising theory in general discounts the 
content of advertisements and takes more seriously the number of times 
consumers encounter a brand name in any context.122  In other words, the 
number of times a brand is mentioned in a national newspaper (“newspaper 
                                                 
120 See Graeme Austin, Tolerating Confusion about Confusion:  Trademark Policy and 
Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 167 (2008) ([A]ccurate assessment of the strength of 
the mark in any dispute would be difficult without some reference to consumer 
impressions. Assessing the strength of a mark necessarily involves some kind of inquiry 
into how consumers respond to the messages about the trademark that its proprietor has 
conveyed, mostly through branding and promotion. Similarly, a firm achieves sufficient 
“fame” for the purposes of dilution doctrine when the trademark has sufficiently 
penetrated consumers' consciousness. Proxies are sometimes used in the course of this 
inquiry: courts might focus on how long the mark has been used in a particular 
marketing sector, or how many promotion and advertising dollars have been spent on 
it.”) 
121 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 15:50 (4th ed. 2010) 







hits”) may provide fairly relevant information about brand/consumer 
associations and therefore the attractiveness of the brand to appropriators. 
We counted a large number of newspaper hits for the 37 marks, 
peaking with 42,582 hits in 1970 and 43,758 hits in 1985.  In raw numbers, 
there is a very significant decline, down to 8078 hits in the year 2005, with 
barely more than 10,000 hits in 2000 and 1995, but these figures do not account 
for change in the size of the newspapers from year to year, nor for the fact that 
after a certain point Wall Street Journal (1992) and Washington Post (1993) 
data are unavailable in the Historical Newspapers On-Line (Proquest) database.  
So, after 1993, we only measure hits in the New York Times.   
In order to account for changes in the contents of the newspaper 
database--a problem because fewer pages scanned means less data and 
presumably fewer hits--we used the five most common words in the English 
language as a baseline for the years studied.  We tracked the words “the,” “of,” 
“a,” “in,” and “to” (together “most common words”) in the same way we 
tracked the 37 brand names.  If the newspaper database remained the same size, 
the number of hits for these words should not have varied much from year to 
year.  Therefore, any change we saw in the number of common words should 
have been the result of a change in the size of the database due to the variable 
size of newspapers or due to the post-1992 absence of the Wall Street Journal 
and post-1993 absence of the Washington Post.  What we see, for example, is 
that in 1990 the most common words were mentioned 1,937,000 times in the 
three newspaper database, but in 1993, the number drops to 1,352,890 and then 
to 583,000 in 1995.  By comparing changes in the frequency of hits on the most 
common words with the frequency of hits on our 37 brand names, we are able 
to provide an accurate picture of real changes in the mentioning of the brands.  
In other words, we charted a real decline in brand names only if their rate of 
decline was greater than the rate of decline of the five most common words 
over the same period of time. 
Figure 4 below presents the number of brand name hits as a proportion 
of the number of five-most-common-word hits.  We list the real trend for our 
37 marks as the line labeled, “strong brand.”  We also chart hits on four of the 
most common brand names from our entire list of 131 marks.  The line labeled, 
“common brand,” charts the frequency with which Diamond, Eagle, 
Metropolitan, and Royal are mentioned in relation to the five most common 
English words.  Since those four marks were representative of those omitted, 
we were curious to see if they behaved any differently from the more 
exclusively controlled 37 famous brands. 
Figure 4 
















The graph seems to show the prominence of the brands rising from 
1960, peaking from 1980-95 and then declining sharply to 2005.  We grew to 
doubt, however, whether the data told a reliable story about brand popularity 
because the initial data used above included mentions of the brand names in 
classified advertising.  We decided that we should rerun the numbers without 
the classified ads hits for several reasons.  First, many of our most frequently 
mentioned brands were associated with goods that could be resold,123 and a 
very high percentage of yearly “hits,” sometimes as much as 50%, came from 
ads in the classified sections of the New York Times and Washington Post.  
When a brand is mentioned in the classified ads, it does not make an impression 
on a substantial number of consumers, as opposed to a large print ad or a story.  
Second, an appearance in the classifieds may suggest a loss in brand luster.  For 
example, those seeking to sell their Cadillacs may be dissatisfied with them or 
looking to finance the purchase of a new Honda.  The appearance of some 
brands in the classifieds may also be a measure of hard economic times.  In 
some years, IBM and Steinway are mentioned frequently in the classifieds as 
sellers try to raise needed cash.  Third, the Wall Street Journal does not have 
nearly so many pages of classified “for sale” ads as the other two papers, so 
when it drops out in 1993, the data becomes skewed.  Fourth, and most 
importantly, after the mid-1990’s the number of hits in classified ads plummets 
to a tiny fraction of previous levels.  In 1993, for example, there were 1,970 
classifieds ads for Cadillacs, but only 69 in 2005.  As people begin to sell goods 
on-line instead of in newspapers, the loss of ads generates an artificial down-
tick in brand prominence if one includes classifieds in the hit count. 
If one omits classified ads from the adjusted hit count below, the graph 
changes looks quite different: 
                                                 
123 Including Buick, Bulova, Cadillac, IBM, Kodak, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Packard, 






















The trend for both lines since 1960 is generally up, and significantly so.124  In 
other words, in proportion to the five most commonly used words, the 37 
brands we tracked appeared more frequently in newspapers over the course of 
the 50-year-period during which we saw a decline in independent use.  Thus, 
for example, if we imagine that a reader of a daily newspaper spent about the 
same time reading the paper every day over that period, and therefore read 
about the same number of words per newspaper issue, she would encounter 
more mentions of the 37 brands in 2005 than in 1960.   
Of course, if the daily newspaper reader read the paper cover-to-cover 
every day over those 45 years, she would encounter fewer mentions in 2005 
than in 1960.  The raw number of mentions of the 37 brands decreased over the 
50-year period, although not at nearly as high at rate as the total volume of text 
in the newspapers, as measured by the samples of the five most commonly used 
words.   Yet, it is at least plausible that the average newspaper reader, during 
her incomplete perusal of the daily paper, was exposed in 2005 to a number of 
mentions of our 37 brands that equaled or exceeded the number to which she 
was exposed in 1960. If that is the case, then we have found no support for the 
theory that diminishing popularity drove the decline in brand sharing that we 
documented in the first part of the article.  In fact, the newspaper data may 
provide some indirect support for the notion that increased protection for 
trademarks after 1960 drove the decline in brand sharing.  The same increased 
protection may have given brand owners the confidence to advertise more 
extensively and promote their products to the public.  The proportional increase 
                                                 





in brand name mentions may be the result of investment spurred by an ever 
more friendly legal environment for owners of famous marks. 
 Finally, we wanted to ask one more question about CADILLAC, an 
important mark that saw a sharp decline in the number of independent uses 
from 1960-2010.  We wondered whether GM might have propped up the mark 
through advertising to counter worries about dropping popularity as foreign 
cars begin to dominate the market.  In other words, we wondered what would 














We feel strongly that it is proper to include commercial ads paid for by the 
brand owner in the newspaper hit count statistics.  After all a consumer 
impression is made by a large print advertisement as well as by an unsolicited 
story.  It would seem odd to measure brand prominence and brand value 
without counting the influence of advertising on consumers.  Nonetheless, 
because we assumed that CADILLAC was a dying (or at least sickly) brand, we 
were surprised to see that its proportional increase in mentions was not driven 
by its own advertising expenditures.  It also appears more frequently over time 
in regular news stories. 
 
D.   Structural Changes in the Popularity of Business Name Types.   
 
Because we chose to focus mostly on brand names that have been in 
use for a century or more, many of our brand names reflect naming patterns that 
were prevalent long ago, but may no longer be prevalent.  In an era when 
personal savings often provided the start-up capital for a business and family 
members provided labor, it was quite natural to use the family name as the 
name of the business.  When start-up capital for a business is provided by 
outside investors who may not want to tie the identity of the business too 
closely to the founder, and when family members no longer dominate the 







Thus, for example, a study of the top 100 global brands in 2005 showed that, of 
the 70 brands that had originated before 1945, 40 of them were the family name 
of the founder, whereas of the 30 brands that had originated after 1945, only 3 
were the family name of the founder.125  If the same trend were reflected in the 
telephone books we studied, much of the decline in brand name sharing rates 
that we have observed might be the result of shifts from family names to other 
names rather than overall declines in sharing rates, and perhaps there are other 
brand names we have not included that have become popular more recently.  
One might imagine, for example, the emergence of brand names related to jets, 
rockets and atoms in the post-World War II era, or brand names related to 
ecology and “greenness” in the post-Earth Day era.  We suspect that the trend 
away from family names is less pronounced among the small businesses that 
dominate white pages telephone listings.  To understand whether this is true, 
however, we would have to count uses of a much larger number of brand 
names, which is a very labor-intensive project, and therefore cannot be pursued 
within the scope of this Article.  This factor, then, remains a topic for further 
research. 
 
E.  Personalization and the Flattening of Name Popularity. 
 
Douglas Galbi has documented a significant trend towards less 
concentrated distribution of personal given names over the last two centuries, 
after many centuries of essentially unchanged distribution.126  For example, 
21.5% of the males born in 1800 in England and Wales were given the name 
John, making it the most popular name in that year; in that year, the top 10 
given names for males accounted for 84.7% of the boys born in that year.127  
Samples of given names over the previous 500 years showed very similar 
concentrations.  Yet since 1800, the percentages of the population given the 
most popular and the ten most popular names have both declined steadily, and 
by 1994, the most popular given name for males, James, was given to only 
4.2% of the boys born in that year, and the top 10 names accounted for only 
28.4% of the males born in that year.128  Galbi describes this phenomenon in 
terms of an increased preference for personalization, and a decline of shared 
symbolic experience.  Since the choice of a given name was unfettered by legal 
                                                 
125 See Allan K.K. Chan, Yue Yuan Huang & David X. Wu, Chinese Brand Names & 
Global Brand Names: Implications from Two Corpus Analyses 17, 
http://www.wbiconpro.com/13%5B1%5D.%20Allan-HK.pdf.  
126 See Douglas A. Galbi, Long Term Trends in Personal Given Name Frequencies in 
the UK, Version 1.11 (July 30, 2002) (“Long Term Trends”), 
http://www.galbithink.org/names.htm; Douglas A. Galbi,  A New Account of 
Personalization and Effective Communication, version 1.1 (September 16, 2001), 
http://www.galbithink.org/pers.htm.  
127 See Galbi, Long Term Trends, supra  note xxx, Table 3, Most Popular Names in 
England/Wales. 





constraints throughout this period, the reduced concentration of names cannot 
be explained as a function of legal change, but must stem from cultural factors. 
Cultural forces at work in realigning the distribution of given names 
could also manifest themselves in business naming patterns.  In that case, 
assuming that the stock of business names could itself be increased, as it can by 
coining previously nonexistent words, rates of brand name sharing might 
decrease across the board quite independently of legal influences.  Indeed, the 
new legal rules that limit brand name sharing might not have been adopted if 
judges and legislators were not culturally comfortable with naming diversity 
and the phenomenon of newly coined names. 
As we will detail in Part VII below, in our sample of 131 brand names, 
the distribution of brand names has actually become more concentrated.  
Although sharing rates for those names have declined broadly, they have 
declined less significantly for the names that started out with higher rates of 
sharing.  Thus our sample, over the time period we studied, does not exhibit the 
decreased concentration that Galbi observes. A more comprehensive study of 
business naming concentration would require data about the total number of 
business names in use by businesses in a jurisdiction over time, and that is 
beyond the scope of this study.   
 
VII.  ANTI-DILUTION AND INFRINGEMENT LAWS AS CAUSES OF THE DECLINE 
IN INDEPENDENT USES OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES.    
 
We have noted that there has been a significant decline in the rate of 
independent uses of the 131 famous brand names tracked in this study.  We 
have further noted that that decline does not seem to be entirely accounted for 
by the decline in the total number of brand names listed in the telephone books 
we studied, nor by the decline in residents who have as surnames the famous 
brand names we have chosen to study.  Thus, increased trademark law 
protection seems to have a a role to play in the decline, but what sort of 
correlation might provide evidence that legal changes have played a role?  We 
will consider two possibilities: correlation of declines in uses with the timing of 
legal changes, and correlation of the percentage decline in independent uses of 
each brand name with the initial number of independent uses.  We will 
conclude that the first approach is not promising, but that the second approach 
is. 
 
A.  Correlating the Timing of Declines With the Dates of Legal 
Changes. 
 
We know the precise dates that trademark dilution legislation became 
effective.  The Federal Trademark Dilution Act became effective on January 
16, 1996.129  The states of Illinois and New York first enacted anti-dilution 
legislation in the mid-1950s: Illinois in 1953,130 and New York in 1955.131  
                                                 
129 See P.L. 104-98, §5, 109 Stat. 985, 987 (1995). 







Pennsylvania first enacted anti-dilution legislation in 1984.132  Shifts in judicial 
approaches to trademark infringement are more difficult to pinpoint, but one 
can try to identify key decisions; Gerard Magliocca, for example, argues that 
Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion in the 1961 case of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Elec. Corp.133 was pivotal in resolving a dispute in the Second Circuit in favor 
of broader infringement protection.   
A search for sudden changes in brand name sharing rates immediately 
after these dates, however, will end in disappointment.  When averaged across 
all three cities in the study, brand name sharing rates have dropped steadily for 
the last fifty years, at rates of between fifteen and twenty percent each decade 
between 1960 and 2010.134  Although the rate of decline is slightly higher 
between 1990 and 2000 – the decade that federal dilution litigation is passed – 
there are no obvious sudden movements. 
Yet the lack of sudden changes should not be taken as proof that 
increased trademark protection has had little or no effect.  Rather, it seems 
likely that due to reluctance to apply new rules retroactively and the persistence 
of established independent uses, legislation and shifts in judicial attitude will 
only have a gradual effect on brand-name sharing rates.  As for legislation, 
some courts have explicitly ruled that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
cannot be applied to trademark uses that began before its effective date.135  
Others have decided that injunctive relief may be available against such uses, 
but like all injunctive relief, “subject to the principles of equity,” which would 
counsel against relief against uses that commenced a substantial time before 
enactment of the statute.136  Under either approach, relief under federal dilution 
law is unlikely to be available against established uses.   
Courts do not usually explicitly declare their own doctrinal shifts to be 
prospective only, but they can and do use doctrines of laches and acquiescence 
to limit the retroactive effect of expanded protection.  The case of Polaroid 
                                                                                                                       
131 See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (enacted 1955). 
132 See 54 Pa. C.S. § 1124 (enacted 1984). 
133 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
135 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Office Max ,Inc., 949 F.Supp. 409, 415-18 
(E.D. Va. 1996); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst National Development Corp., 
973 F. Supp. 552, 554-60 (M.D.N.C. 1997); S Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 
Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
136 See Viacom, Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc., 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998).  One 
court has also held that a plaintiff’s federal dilution claim, made 30 years after 
defendant’s commencement of use and 18 years after plaintiff should have known of 
that use, was barred by laches, when  there had been a federal dilution claim available 
for 10 years and a state claim for more than 30 years.  See Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak 
Travel, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2008); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:130  (4th ed.) (arguing 
that a defense of laches should be available against a federal dilution claim even if 
legislation has just made the federal claim available, so long as a substantially 





Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp,137 which Gerard Magliocca argues ushered in an 
era of broader infringement protection, provides a good example.  Although the 
court recognized that infringement protection might be extended to more 
distantly related goods, it held that plaintiff Polaroid Corporation’s claim was 
barred by laches.  The court rejected Polaroid’s argument that a laches bar 
would only arise if Polaroid engaged in affirmative conduct sanctioning 
Polarad’s use, and concluded that an 11-year delay in taking legal action was 
sufficient, so long as Polarad was not making directly competing goods, but 
merely related goods.  The decision thus expands the definition of related 
goods, but limits significantly the retroactive effect of the expansion. 
If both legislation and judicial decisions have limited retroactive effect, 
then a key factor in the timing of the effect of legal changes is the rate of 
turnover of brand name uses: how frequently do older uses cease as businesses 
are dissolved, and how frequently do new uses arise as new businesses are 
created?  Because our database includes a field containing each full business 
name, we were able to analyze rates of turnover of brand name uses.138     Table 










Rates of Turnover of Independent Brand Name Uses in Chicago, Manhattan, 























1940 to 1960 73.15% 66.17% 64.83% 67.35%
1960 and before to 1980 66.78% 67.21% 64.16% 58.29%
1980 and before to 1990 59.95% 59.96% 57.33% 66.72%
                                                 
137 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961). 
138 This required a great deal of proofreading and editing to ensure that the 
representations of a business name remained identical in different years.  For example, 
we had to account for differing abbreviations, such as “Co” and “Corp” for 
“Corporation,” or “Eng” and “Engrg” for “Engineering,” and for the presence and 
absence of “Inc” (a business might be listed as “Crest Roofing Co” in one year, and 







1990 and before to 2000 50.46% 48.64% 48.01% 51.39%
2000 and before to 2010 38.31% 34.00% 33.23% 36.61%
 
The figure in each box represents the percentage of independent brand name 
uses that were found in the ending year of the period listed in the left-hand 
column, but not in the beginning year or in a previous period.  Thus, for 
example, taking the far upper left-hand data cell, for all 131 brand names that 
we covered in the study, 73.15% of the brand name uses that appeared in the 
1960 telephone books had not appeared in the 1940 telephone books.  It is not 
surprising that the highest turnover rate is found between 1940 and 1960, for as 
the reader will recall, the total number of independent uses of the 131 brand 
names increased substantially during this period – from 2293 to 3000, an 
increase of 31% (though the turnover rate is still substantially higher than that 
increase).  Turnover rates for all 131 brand names then decrease for all 
subsequent periods.  The first two periods, of course, are twice as long as the 
last three.  By 2010, only 38.31% of independent uses of the 131 brand names 
did not appear in 2000 or before.  These turnover rates suggest that the effects 
of prospective legal changes would be delayed, but certainly not indefinitely: a 
prospective ban introduced in 2000 would have affected 38.31% of independent 
brand name uses by 2010.  The turnover rates do suggest, however, that 
prospective legal changes will not result in immediate declines and make it 
more difficult to trace a specific portion of the decline in brand-name sharing to 
legal changes.   
The second, third and fourth columns in Table 3 calculate turnover 
rates for specific subsets of the 131 brand names.  The second column considers 
turnover rates for the 45 brand names that were leaders in their product areas in 
both the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, and therefore by one measure can be 
considered consistently famous.  During all periods other than 1960 to 1980 
these rates are somewhat lower.  One conceivable explanation for the lower 
rates is that infringement and dilution protection of these brand names is 
hindering the appearance of new independent uses; but the rates are not 
dramatically lower, and indicate that many new uses of these names appeared 
as well.  We will discuss the third and fourth columns of Figure 8 below. 
 
B.  Correlating Percentage Declines with Initial Numbers of Independent Uses.    
    
Our second attempt to assess the impact of legal changes on brand-
name sharing rates takes advantage of the prominence of third-party use of a 
brand name as a factor in assessing both infringement and dilution liability.  As 
we discussed above in Part I, consideration of that factor is mandated by the 
Trademark Dilution Reform Act, which directs courts to consider “[t]he extent 





use of the mark;”139 it is also an important factor in state dilution law, and in 
state and federal infringement law.   
 Because of the weight accorded the factor of “substantially exclusive 
use,” it is almost certain that many of the brand names we studied, although 
“famous” in the sense that they are widely recognized by the general 
consuming public in the United States, would receive limited dilution 
protection.  Some, indeed, would almost certainly receive no dilution protection 
at all. Although the TDRA treats the extent of third-party use as one factor to be 
balanced with others, many courts and commentators have concluded that if 
third-party use rises above a certain level, protection against dilution becomes 
completely unavailable.140  If we knew exactly which brand names courts 
would refuse to protect on grounds of insufficiently exclusive use, we could use 
the rate of decline of independent uses of those brand names as a baseline.141  
Against that baseline, we would compare the rate of decline of independent 
uses of brand names that met the criterion of substantially exclusive use.  If the 
rate of decline of the independent uses of those qualifying brand names was 
greater than the baseline rate, that would be evidence that the passage of 
dilution laws had had an effect. 
 Unfortunately, we do not know exactly which brand names would be 
denied protection due to third-party uses.  No court has formulated a bright-line 
rule about how many independent uses would result in the denial of protection, 
and a simple count of uses would in any event not suffice, since uses by small, 
local businesses would surely not count against exclusivity as much as high-
volume uses on a national scale.142  Moreover, trademark infringement analysis 
also takes into account the extent of third-party uses in determining the scope of 
protection, and many have argued that infringement protection has expanded 
during the same period that dilution protection was introduced, particularly for 
those marks that are famous enough to qualify for protection against dilution.143 
Isolating the effect of new anti-dilution statutes is therefore difficult.         
                                                 
139 P.L. 109-312, §2, 120 Stat. 1729, 1731 (2006), codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006) 
140 See n. 15 supra. 
141 We make a guess with the 37 brands we graph in Figure 2. 
142 One formulation of a test to determine whether third-party uses would affect dilution 
protection was articulated by Anne Gundelfinger, testifying as the President of the 
International Trademark Association during a hearing on the TDRA.  As she put it, the 
question is whether those uses “have . . . visibility to the average consumer.”  
Testimony of Anne Gundlefinger, President, International Trademark Association, 
before House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, 
Committee on the Judiciary, February 17, 2005, (109th Cong., 1st Sess) (“[W]here 
other similar marks are already in wide use and have been over a lengthy period of 
time, it may be less likely that the junior use will have the effect of blurring the famous 
mark, unless those uses have little or no visibility to the average consumer.”) 
143 See Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from 
the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA 







If, however, we limit our aspirations to determining if we can see some 
impact of legal change in general, without attempting to separate out the effects 
of anti-dilution statutes from those of increased infringement protection, it 
should be possible to formulate a testable hypothesis that takes into account the 
factor of third-party uses, even without knowing exactly the number and size of 
such uses that courts would find precluded dilution protection.  If increased 
legal protection has caused a reduction in independent uses, then the 
proportionate decline in independent uses should be greater with respect to 
those brand names that had fewer independent uses to begin with. 
With this hypothesis in mind, we attempted to compare rates of decline 
of independent uses among brand names that started out with a higher number 
of independent uses to rates of decline among brand names that started out with 
a lower number of such uses.  We focused in particular on those 45 brand 
names that appeared in both the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, since the owners 
of those continuously famous names would have been in a position to take 
advantage of anti-dilution protection, though we also looked at changes in 
independent use rates among all 131 brand names.   
Of the 45 continuously famous brand names, 37 had at least one 
independent use in 1960.144 (Of the other eight consistently famous brand 
names that had no independent uses in 1960, seven had no independent uses in 
2010 either; the sole exception, Life-Savers, had one independent use.)145  In 
the aggregate, the 36 brand names had 1291 independent uses in 1960; in 2010, 
they had 535 independent uses, a decrease of 58.56%.146  The results of our 
comparison of the 36 brand names are displayed in Figures 2 and 3.    Both 
Figures arrange the brand names in order of the number of independent uses 
that they had in 1960, starting with the highest number on the left.  
 
FIGURE 7 
Independent Uses of Consistently Famous Marks in Chicago, Manhattan, and 
Philadelphia, 1960 & 2010147
                                                 
144 See [spreadsheet InHInG 1960-2010] 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 





        
Figure 7 shows that, of all of the consistently famous brand names that 
had at least one independent use in 1960, only one, Tiffany, actually 
experienced an increase in independent uses, and only two, Lipton and Gold 
Medal, had roughly equal numbers of independent uses in both years.  All other 
brand names experienced substantial decreases in independent uses.   
It is difficult to visually compare rates of change in independent uses in 
Figure 7, but Figure 8 shows these somewhat more clearly.  Figure 8 displays 
three lines.  The blue line traces the percentage change in independent uses of 
each brand name in the same order as Figure 7.  It shows that the two brand 
names with the highest number of independent uses in 1960 did indeed exhibit 
lower-than-average rates of decline: independent uses of Metropolitan declined 
by only about 38%, while independent uses of Eagle declined by about 49%.  
From there on, the line becomes a bit more erratic, as rates of change of 
individual brand names vary up and down, and that fluctuation increases as we 
reach brand names with very few initial uses in 1960, with the result that one 
fewer or greater use in 2010 can have a large percentage effect.  The line leaves 
the figure area when it reaches “Tiffany,” because that brand name experienced 
a 217% increase in independent uses between 1960 and 2010, from 6 to 19.  
Finally, the line is flat at a 100% decline for the last four brand names, because 










Percentage Changes in Rates of Independent Use of 36 Consistently Famous 




The other two lines attempt to smooth out that individual variation.  
The red line displays a five-name moving average; its position at each brand 
name is the result of averaging the rate of decline of that brand name and the 
two brand names to its left and to its right.  That line demonstrates a small but 
fairly steady increase in rates of decline through about 19 of the 36 brand name.  
By the time we reach the twentieth brand name, Heinz, we are down to 13 
independent uses in 1960, a very steep drop from the 312 independent uses in 
1960 of Metropolitan.  The five-name moving average line then starts to climb, 
because a few of the brand names that had between six and ten independent 
uses in 1960 declined significantly less, and in one case, the number of 
independent uses actually increased.  It then falls at the end due to the last four 
drops from one or two uses to zero.   
Finally, the green line displays the cumulative average percentage 
change for all brand names to the left of each point on the line.  It also reveals a 





name, followed by a gradual decrease until the final increase for the last four 
names. 
This pattern of declines is consistent with our hypothesis that trademark 
law will have a greater effect on sharing rates of those famous brand names that 
began with a small enough number of independent uses that the owners could 
claim to be engaged in “substantially exclusive use” of their trademarks.  The 
two brand names that began with over 200 independent uses experienced, on 
average, declines of 43%; the top eight brands, all of which began with more 
than 40 independent uses, experienced average declines of 63%; and those 15 
brands that began with from 10 to 21 independent uses experienced average 
declines of 73%.  If we decided that the factor of “substantially exclusive use” 
would moderately weigh against those brand names with more than 40 
independent uses, whereas it would weigh substantially less against those brand 
names with less than 22 independent uses, we would conclude that changes in 
trademark protection account for at least 10% of the decline in independent 
uses of brand names.  One might argue that 22 independent uses are far too 
many for a trademark owner to claim to be engaged in substantially exclusive 
use.  Recall, however, that most of the uses found in telephone books are uses 
on a very small scale – single-location grocery stores, cleaning services, and the 
like – the markets of which are confined to particular cities or even particular 
neighborhoods of those cities.  It is likely that a court could find that a 
substantial number of such uses “have little or no visibility to the average 
consumer,”148 given that the “average consumer” in question must be 
constructed from consumers spread across the entire country.149  
To obtain a different perspective on this data, we also ran a few 
regressions.  First, we looked at the 21 consistently famous brand names that 
had at least a dozen independent uses in 1960, excluding those with a smaller 
number of initial independent uses on the theory that the sample size of those 
names was too small.  We set the number of independent uses in 1960 as the 
independent variable and the percentage decline of those uses from 1960 to 
2010 as the dependent variable.  The result was an R Square of 0.458583 and a 
P-value of 0.00074, suggesting a very high probability that the initial number of 
uses accounted for roughly 45% of the percentage decline.  We then ran the 
                                                 
148 See supra n. 96 (quoting testimony from the President of the International 
Trademark Association, Anne Gundelfinger, on the interpretation of “substantially 
exclusive use”). 
149 One example of such a finding can be found in Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal 
International, Inc., 2007 WL 2782030, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007). In that 
case, the defendant Nikepal argued that Nike, Inc. was not engaged in substantially 
exclusive use of the mark “Nike” because another company, Nike Hydraulics, Inc., had 
been continuously using the mark for 50 years and had held a federal registration for it 
since 1958.  The court rejected that argument, noting that defendant’s witness had 
himself not been personally familiar with Nike Hydraulics, Inc. before commencement 
of the litigation. Id. at *7. Most of the uses in white pages telephone books are not the 
subject of a federal registration and are on a far smaller scale than Nike Hydraulics, 
Inc.; Nikepal did not even attempt to look for uses on that scale, but confined itself to a 







same regression on the brand names that were not consistently famous – that 
appeared in the 1921 Hotchkiss study but not in the 1997 Golder study.  
Thirteen of those brand names had at least 12 independent uses.  Once again 
setting the number of initial uses as the independent variable and the percentage 
decline as the dependent variable, we obtained an R Square of 0.073231 and a 
P-value of 0.371191.  Thus, there was a much weaker relationship between 
number of initial uses and percentage decline among those brand names that 
had lost their fame some time in between 1921 and 1997.  This, we think, is 
consistent with the hypothesis that legal change played some role in the 
decrease in independent uses.  If the once-famous use of a brand name lost wide 
recognition or ceased altogether, it is less likely that any user would be in a 
position to claim broad infringement protection or dilution protection, and 
hence the initial number of independent uses would have little impact on the 
rate of decline over time, which is what the second regression seems to show.  
Only if a famous use was consistent would that user otherwise be in a position 
to claim broad infringement or dilution protection, thus making the degree of 
“substantial exclusive use” relevant to whether that protection could be 
obtained.  Our first regression seems to demonstrate that relevance.    
Of course, it is possible that there are explanations of the higher 
decreases among low-initial-independent-use brand names that have nothing to 
do with the increase in infringement protection and the introduction of dilution 
protection.     Even if the decline in independent uses we document is driven by 
changes in the legal landscape, the evidence of a legal effect is only moderately 
strong, in part because the turnover rates for independent uses of consistently 
famous brand names with 11 to 20 initial uses are not dramatically lower than 
those for the eight consistently famous brand names with over 40 initial uses.  
As Table 3 shows, the turnover rates of the brand names with a smaller number 
of initial independent uses are actually higher during all periods but one.  One 
interpretation of this could be that legal protection does not deter independent 
users from initial use, but does then eventually lead to discontinuance of some 
of those uses, resulting in a higher turnover rate.  We do not, however, have any 
evidence that this is the correct interpretation. 
It is worth mentioning that because third-party use is important in both 
infringement and dilution analysis, law can work to magnify the effect of the 
non-legal factors that are reducing brand-name sharing.  In 1960, some brand 
names may have been shared by too many users to support a claim by the most 
famous of those users that it was engaging in “substantially exclusive use” of 
the name.  Yet by 1990 or 2000, non-legal factors may have reduced the rate of 
sharing to a level at which the factor of substantially exclusive use would weigh 
more heavily in favor of the famous user.  For example, at the time that the 
sportswear manufacturer Nike, Inc. first used the brand name “Nike” in 1973, 
there was not just one other federal registration for that name; rather, there were 
at least five.150  In addition to Nike Hydraulics, there were registrations for 
                                                 
150 There may have been more, because the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office online 






NIKE adhesive tape dispensers,151 for sandwiches,152 for perfume,153 and for a 
club.154  These uses, however, have all ceased, presumably for reasons 
unrelated to trademark law, and that has left Nike, Inc. in a better position to 
claim that it is engaged in substantially exclusive use of the brand name “Nike,” 
and thus to use trademark infringement and dilution law to prevent further 
sharing of that name. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the sharing of brand names has been a feature of commercial 
life since time immemorial, and has long been recognized and accommodated 
by trademark law, scholars have paid little direct attention to brand-name 
sharing as a phenomenon and never noticed changing rates of brand-name 
sharing.  This Article has attempted to provide an introduction to the study of 
brand-name sharing, and to present the results of an initial empirical study of 
the sharing of 131 brand names in three cities over a 70-year period.  A major 
finding is the dramatic decline in sharing rates of these 131 names between 
1960 and 2010.  This Article has considered several potential non-legal causes 
of that decline, but also suggests that increased trademark infringement 
protection, and newly introduced trademark dilution protection, may have been 
responsible for a substantial portion of that decline.  Further empirical work 
will help us to understand more about a phenomenon that has been a common 




                                                 
151 See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 622166. 
152 See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 771978. 
153 See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 775529. 
154 See U.S. Trademark Registration No. 862551. 
 
 
